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The Week

AMERICANS must surely be thankful that in Paris we had one statesman unafraid to speak the truth loudly. It is to Herbert Hoover more than to anyone else that credit is due for averting an entente between the Peace Conference and a new Hapsburg monarchy. Declaring it "no time to deal with the Hungarian people by hints or innuendos," Mr. Hoover attacked the fashion in which the Allies first invited the Hungarian trade unionists to set up a moderate socialist government, and then abandoned them flatly. "Reaction like that in Hungary," he asserted, "will revive Bolshevism all over Europe. If we hoped Bolshevism would die a natural death in Russia we have done more to prevent that death by tolerating a Hapsburg than by any other means we could have designed in a hundred years."

MR. HOOVER'S protest drove the Peace Conference to action which our own timid delegation in Paris should immediately and emphatically have demanded. It is a late day to redeem the prestige lost by Allied policy in Hungary—and a late day, too, for the Hungarians to redeem their own democracy. The new Cabinet, if it is to be headed by Baron Perenyi, seems a better reproduction of the regime of the Archduke Joseph than of the democratic Peidll government set up by the trade unionists. Nor can Hungary regain her democracy, or even reestablish order, while a Rumanian army remains in Budapest. "Rumania," Mr. Hoover says, "is still taking food from Hungary in defiance of the Peace Conference—taking it before the face and eyes of Allied representatives and officers representing the American Relief Commission—taking it despite protests made every hour. Three or four days ago the Rumanians removed all the food, milk and medicine from the Children's Hospital of Budapest. Eighteen children died the next day because there was nothing to give them."

PRESIDENT WILSON'S appeal for a truce in the struggle for higher wages will carry great weight with the employing classes, little weight with economists and none at all with labor. The demands of the railway shopmen, and likewise those of other classes of labor imply, according to the President's reasoning, increases in wages which are likely to be permanent in order to meet a temporary situation—high living costs—"that will last nobody can certainly tell how long, but in all probability only for a limited time." That is, the final result might be that labor would be permanently better off than it is today, if the increases were granted. But that is one of the things that labor is driving at. Besides, argues the President, if wages are raised, the herculean efforts of the government to reduce prices will be defeated. Higher wages amount to higher costs, and these in turn amount to higher prices. If this reasoning were conclusive, and lower prices in themselves a desideratum, why does not the President propose to reduce wages? Lower wages; lower costs; lower prices—the summum bonum—is an equally good logical chain. The weak links in the two chains are identical. Wages are not the whole of costs, but at most rather more than half, taking the productive process as a whole. A ten per cent increase in wages does not necessarily imply more than a five per cent increase in prices. The winning of higher wages is not then a case of bootstrap levitation, as the President assumes. It is a rational method of reducing the margin between inflated prices and wages not so inflated.

ANY one who will go to the trouble of examining the history of labor successes and failures in the United States,

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or for that matter in any other industrial country, will find no difficulty in verifying the general principle that most successes are won in periods of rising prices while periods of falling prices are distinguished by frequent and disastrous labor defeats. Improvements in labor standards are established in periods of prosperity; in periods of depression about the best that labor can do is to keep a substantial part of its winnings. This is so clear to every intelligent workingman that it seems to him a part of the elementary knowledge that a child drinks in with his mother's milk. Naturally he rubs his eyes when the President of the United States proclaims in effect: "We are at the peak of a period of inflation; therefore it is very unwise to move for higher wages. Let labor sit tight until falling prices and business depression are upon us. Then, my children, you may agitate for higher wages."

IN the hands of the United States Steel Corporation rests power to decide in a large degree what course the development of industrial relations shall follow during the next few years. Representatives of twenty-four unions concerned in the steel industry have made demands that include the right of collective bargaining, the establishment of an 8-hour day, abolition of the 24-hour shift, provision of one day's rest in seven, increase in wages sufficient to guarantee an American standard of living, and a standardization of wage scales for all crafts and classifications of workers. To enforce these demands 98 per cent of the workers voting on the issue have empowered their representatives to call a strike if necessary. There has been much discussion lately of industrial democracy and of the readiness of employers to meet legitimate demands of their employees without any drastic reorganization of industry. The good faith of such statements is now put to a test.

AT a time when there is more industrial unrest than the country has ever known the War Labor Board is permitted to cease functioning. It dies because no one is interested in keeping it alive, despite its fifteen months of experience and its adjustment of twelve hundred disputes. No funds are left to keep it running. Congress provided none, and the President made no request of Congress. As a result we are left with no federal agency to mediate between capital and labor save one entirely inadequate bureau in the Department of Labor. Large employers, particularly those who have had adverse decisions, may rejoice in the death of the War Labor Board. It is not their triumph, however. The Board, with its records and experience, was clearly an influence for orderly adjustment. With its suspension, public participation in the adjustment of controversies is very largely withdrawn.

IF it was desirable that China should be given an honest settlement of her claims, then only one course was possible for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations—and that course the Committee has followed. There is no use failing to see facts. Japan may name definitely a year, month, and day for the return of political sovereignty in Shantung. That is of secondary importance so long as she retains economic sovereignty in the province. Mr. Wilson told the Senators in his White House conference that political sovereignty was the essential factor. But what does political sovereignty mean—when a country loses one of its greatest ports, all cable communications to that port, all mineral resources, and a railway leading straight towards Peking—an open road for any Japanese army?

BY various Democratic Senators it is asserted that this action of the Committee constitutes no solution for the problem that faced the Senate. The treaty, they say, will now have to go back to Paris for consideration—and then there is no telling what may happen. Germany (never consulted in the original framing of the treaty) will suddenly find power to enforce her own demands for amendments. England and France, bound by their secret treaties, will take the side of Japan—and there may even be a new anti-American alliance. For our own part we do not share these fears. American support is something for which the Powers of Europe will bid our own price, if we ask it. And we should ask it only in the interests of world peace. For the Versailles settlement of China's claims, if not definitely revised, is a certain promise of war in the Far East.

SO far as we know, a recent address in Parliament by Lord Robert Cecil on the question of Russian intervention has received no attention in the American press. From the Manchester Guardian's account of that address we quote this passage, an indication of what one conservative British Unionist is thinking: "Lord Robert fully agreed about the folly of 'smashing Bolshevism.' He did not believe there was anybody really prepared to advocate a policy of that kind. ('Oh.') Well, there might be a few. But the talk of marching an army into that gigantic country and seizing Moscow—all that kind of thing was fantastic nonsense. (Cheers.) If it could be done it would not be the least use. Bolshevism was a creed, an idea, and we should not smash it by seizing Moscow, but on the contrary should give its sympathizers the excuse for saying that but for our intervention it would have succeeded. . . . If the Allies, acting together, could lay down broad lines and tell these various factions and governments they were to be content to remain within these lines . . . he should be warmly in favor of it."

IT is plain that the administration in Washington faces a time limit on its use of American troops to keep the Siberian railways open for Admiral Kolchak. During the week a delegation from Chicago appeared in Washington with a petition bearing 100,000 names, urging the immediate recall from Siberia of draft troops in the 27th and 31st Infantry regiments. The delegation was received by Mr. Wilson, who declared that as rapidly as new recruits can be enlisted and equipped they are being shipped to Siberia to relieve the draft men. This policy indicates a fairly early return of the conscripted soldiers—but why are any troops at all being used in a country against which Congress has never declared war? The delegation from Chicago has put its case before a committee of the House. And if the committee members are in touch with the growing resentment throughout the country against the use

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of American troops as a spearhead for Russian reaction they will see this issue through to its end.

WITH French and British interests clashing in Asia Minor, Japan seizing territory from China, and Italy still quarreling with the Jugoslavs, it is not surprising that conditions in the Balkans grow continually worse. The little states are being treated to an example in profiteering by their peers—and boundary disputes are making the Balkans ready for another war. Serbia feels that Rumania was given too much of the Banat—but Rumania complains because she got no more. Albania sends a cable to the American Senate, protesting against the "imperialism" of Serbia, Italy and Greece. In Balkan politics the single encouraging development of recent weeks is news that the American solution may be accepted for Thrace. Why? Because, says a correspondent to the New York Times, "not having been at war with Bulgaria, America had a free hand"—and all parties accordingly bid for our support. There is a practical demonstration here of the claim that until the governments of Europe have changed, American influence will be greatest where it is not pledged in advance.

AUSTRIA'S reply to the Peace Conference is kept secret, but its text is summarized by a correspondent of the New York Globe in a cable from Paris. The terms of the treaty, Austria declares, are impracticable. The new government obviously cannot refuse to do what it is forced to do, but it dislikes signing engagements which are impossible of fulfilment. The frontiers are unjust and deliver over many German-Austrians to other states. Elections have shown that 33 per cent of the voters in Bohemia, 20 per cent in Moravia and 66 per cent in Silesia are Germans. Three million Germans, the Austrians say, are shut up within the new borders of Czechoslovakia alone. Finally, Austria protests against the nature of the payments demanded as reparation. In the first place, how can cattle be surrendered when Mr. Hoover is today obliged to supply Austria with condensed milk to keep the children alive? And if the sum of the payments is to remain indeterminate, then Austria claims that the whole future of the country is placed in the hands of a reparations' commission upon which Austrians have no representation.

IN England the clash between the coalition government and the forces of labor will certainly be hastened by Mr. Lloyd George's rejection of the Sankey report. For months British miners have waited for the government to accept that report and initiate a policy of gradual nationalization of the coal mines. Mr. Lloyd George now refuses to go ahead. In place of the Sankey reports he proposes partial government control, plus a charity fund to improve the living conditions of the miners. Not only is nationalization rejected, but Mr. Lloyd George proposes to take the royalty owners under cover by having the government buy them out on a very different basis of valuation from the one demanded by the workers. In effect he challenges the miners as obviously as possible, and either by political or industrial action it is certain that his challenge will be accepted.

A RECENT bulletin of the American Union Against Militarism calls attention to one point in the appropriation bills passed by the Republican Congress. For *general education* during the year ending June 20, 1920, Congress has set aside $524,600. For *military drill* in high schools and colleges, during the same period, a sum almost eight times as large ($4,000,000) has been appropriated. To make even a little sharper the misplaced emphasis, it is provided—by one of those odd turns common in Congressional action—that part of the small sum set aside for general education must be diverted "to the maintenance of reindeer stations in Alaska."

THROUGH its various phases the actors' strike in New York has followed faithfully the course of the ordinary strike in any other industry, from timber-cutting to the sewing of garments. A company union, made up of the non-strikers, is the latest development. And as is regularly the case with company unions, its organizers say that while they have not been inspired by the managers they are nevertheless "with" them. Next Mr. George Cohan becomes president of the union, and in words reminiscent of Mr. Gary assuring the steel workers that it is he who has their interests most at heart, declares "I have never been so much a friend of the actor as I am this minute." Finally the new union sets out to win the strikers individually away from their Association. Only in one respect does the actors' strike differ from all others: In this instance the strikers' case has had its fair share of the publicity.

WHEN John R. Shillady was mobbed in Austin, Texas —because he was a representative of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People—the Association wired Governor Hobby asking whether steps had been taken to secure justice. The Governor replied: "Shillady was the only offender in connection with the matter referred to in your telegram, and he was punished before your inquiry came." If no protest is made by the people of Texas against this cheap defence of violence it will be an unfortunate reflection on the credit of the state. The Association Mr. Shillady represents does not aim to "stir up" the negroes—which was the excuse of the Austin mobbers —but to combat lynching and violence. It is hard to believe that responsible Southerners will accept this statement of Governor Hobby's in silence.

WITH profound respect we draw the attention of Woodrow Wilson and the Peace Conference to the following fact: the Victory Arch in New York is crumbling and is declared by the New York World to be a menace to life. The Victory horses have been reduced by rain to shapeless lumps of putty and the wings of Victory are about to fall off. "The entire work was so badly constructed that no allowance was made for additional weight. The framework was figured to hold only the weight of the monument, allowing for no excess weight, such as rain or snow, and allowing no pressure of severe storms. We have now reached a point of danger." Can the framework be reinforced? Perhaps. But ought not a Victory Arch be so constructed as to stand a few days of rain?

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Mr. Wilson Testifies

IN any ordinary human transaction if one man is asked to say to another: "I promise on my honor to do certain things for you and with you," the first thing he would inquire about was what he was promising to do. With one exception, Shantung, no such inquiry was permitted at the White House conference. The Senators and the President discussed at great length whether the promise was "legal" in the international sense or in the municipal, whether it was moral in Protestant or objective ethics, but what the promise was about they were not allowed to discuss. The promise is to guarantee world relations as they exist as the result of the treaties. The character of those relations Mr. Wilson himself described as fundamental. "Do you think I ought to redebate here the fundamental questions that were debated at Paris," said the President standing very high indeed on his dignity. What better place, one may ask, to redebate what was discussed in utter secrecy by four men in Paris than in the presence of the elected representatives of that people who are asked to pledge all they have on those very questions? Had Mr. Wilson been merely a privileged listener at those sacred rites in the Council of Four, did no duty descend upon us as a result of what he heard and did, this reticence would be defensible. It is not on any other ground. And if any proof were lacking, the proof is here, that instead of carrying to Europe the republican tradition of open dealing and plain honesty, Mr. Wilson brought back with him the corrupt tradition of dynastic politics under which "fundamental questions" are too fundamental to be discussed in the presence of a vulgar people.

Much was said by Mr. Wilson in regard to morals and conscience as they are to operate in the future. But before entering upon speculations of that kind it is necessary to see a little more clearly how they are operating now. Let us take three cases raised at the White House. The first is about the Island of Yap. In the secret arrangements between Japan and Britain, by which Japan acquired whatever it is that she acquires in Shantung, the Ambassador added: "It is of course understood that we are to have the islands south of the equator and Japan to have the islands north of the equator." Yap is north of the equator. It was not assigned to Japan in the treaty because America stipulated otherwise. Yet under the secret treaty it was hers as rightfully as Shantung ever was. Thus it appears that where our own immediate interest was concerned (it is a real interest) we were able to break through the secret treaty; but where the interests of the Chinese people were concerned, the President yielded. Now either that treaty was binding or it was not. It cannot be binding as respects China and not as respects the United States.

The second case also relates to the Far East. The President told Senator McCumber that Japan's promise to restore Shantung (with highly important reservations) was "evidenced" in the procès verbal, or what we should call the minutes of the Council of Four. Those minutes are not available to the Senate of the United States. They were also not available to the representatives of China in Paris. Thus we start our career of conscience and morals by disposing of the territory of an associate, and nobody is allowed even to see the records of the meeting on which the decision was made. Is it permissible to ask whether the Council of the League proposes to observe the same proprieties, and whether the secret meetings of the Reparation Commission are to be conducted on the same high plane?

The third case deals with the secret treaties made by the Allies in regard to the settlement of European and Near Eastern questions. To Senator Borah the President said that "the whole series of understandings were disclosed to me for the first time" when he reached Paris. To Senator Johnson the President stated specifically that the Treaty of London (dealing with Italy's claims) and the other agreements of 1916 and 1917 were not known to him officially or unofficially at any time between the rupture with Germany and the armistice. On the face of it this admission would utterly condemn the President as incompetent. How any man could have dared publicly to discuss, as he did, the settlement of this war without informing himself of these treaties passes all understanding. These remarks, be it understood, are based on the assumption that the President told the truth to the Senators. But the matter unfortunately cannot rest there. On March 4, 1918, Mr. King, a member of the House of Commons, asked Mr. Balfour, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, "whether there have been communicated to President Wilson copies of all treaties, whether secret or public, and memoranda of all other agreements or undertakings to which this country has become a party since 4th August, 1914." Mr. Balfour replied that "President Wilson is kept fully informed by the Allies." On the public record alone, comparing what Mr. Balfour said March 4, 1918, with what Mr. Wilson said August 19, 1919, there occurs what anywhere but in diplomacy would be called a question of veracity. Tough as it is on Mr. Balfour we are

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forced to accept the President's word for it that he was not officially informed. Was he unofficially informed? He says not. At this point our faith in the President's complete veracity wavers a bit. An examination of the Fourteen Points will show an almost miraculous coincidence between the phrasing of certain of the clauses and the President's rather well-known dislike of the secret treaties. Specifically we recommend a comparison between the careful phraseology of Point VIII (France) and the Franco-Russian correspondence in the winter of 1917; also a comparison between the curious phrasing of Point IX (Italy) and the Treaty of London. It is an obvious case of clairvoyance, assuming of course that Mr. Wilson was not even unofficially informed of the secret treaties.

We have, of course, no way of knowing what Mr. Wilson reads, but we imagine that the New York Sun and New York Times of December 2, 1917, and the New York Evening Post of January 25, 26, 28, 1918, were at the White House. They contain the secret treaties. Also we submit the following from Secretary Lansing's testimony:

> Senator Moses, As I recall, one of the first steps taken by the Lenin-Trotsky regime was the publication of certain secret archives of the Russian government?
>
> Secretary Lansing. Yes.
>
> Senator Moses. Including what purported to be texts of many secret treaties. Did the embassy report upon those to this government?
>
> Secretary Lansing. All of them.

Lenin seized power November 7, 1917, and the publication of the treaties followed on November 23, 1917. The texts were sent to the Department of State. They were published in the newspapers, and commented upon from one end of the world to the other. The President says, when asked whether he had "any knowledge prior to the conference at Paris": "I can confidently answer that question, no, in regard to myself." This general affirmation of ignorance includes a specific insistence that he was ignorant of the Treaty of London. If Mr. Wilson was not aware of this treaty, which formed the basis of the Italo-Jugoslav controversy, it would be interesting to have him explain why a member of the American embassy at Rome attended the Congress of oppressed Austrian nationalities in April, 1918, or what the two statements of Mr. Lansing, at the end of May and at the end of June, had reference to if not to the controversy of which that treaty was the principal issue.

These secret treaties, let it be remembered, determined at the most critical points the settlement of a war in which 50,000 Americans were killed. We are asked to believe that Mr. Wilson did not know of them during the war, though of course Colonel House and Secretary Lansing did. We had thought they were his principal advisers on foreign affairs. Secretary Lansing had a copy of the treaties. Colonel House had all the necessary information about them. Just where the amnesia set in would carry us into the region of inferences. Some one of those three gentlemen, Mr. Wilson, Colonel House, and Mr. Lansing, was at some time or other not quite all there.

If it were not bad form to question the truthfulness of the President, it would be interesting to inquire why the President thought it necessary to deceive Senator Johnson and the American people. What does he gain by pretending that he knew nothing of the secret treaties until he reached Paris? By the pretence he certainly sacrifices every intelligent person's respect for his ability, because only a dunce would be ignorant of such profoundly important matters as these treaties, especially when they were common knowledge. Mr. Wilson knew about them in substance at least. Of that, out of respect for his intelligence, we must be certain. Why then feign ignorance? The answer is that he now pretends ignorance in order to evade the question which is the supreme question of American diplomacy during the war: Why was no agreement reached during the war as to the status of the secret treaties in view of the Fourteen Points and the agreement in the armistice? That question searches out the roots of Mr. Wilson's failure both moral and practical, and rather than face it, he is willing to make himself out a man totally ignorant of that diplomacy in which he is supposed to have been a leading figure.

The President With His Fingers Crossed

FORBIDDEN to discuss what it is the American people are asked to promise, the White House conference devoted the bulk of its attention to the form of the promise. That turns on Article X which Mr. Wilson described as the very backbone of the League. To that we should agree. It is the very backbone of this league. But it was not even a part of that genuine league which men like General Smuts originally proposed. What they wanted, what liberals the world over have wanted when they agitated for a League of Nations was a league of all the nations in which the legislators could find some representation, in which the sanction of force was applied only to compelling peaceful adjustment of disputes. What

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they have got is an essentially secret committee of five executives who may use force not merely to compel peaceful adjustment but to compel adjustment in accordance with the status quo. Such a league is a caricature of what was anticipated, and a very sinister one at that. The result is that liberals are faced with this problem: Can the present alliance masquerading as the League of Nations be rendered harmless, and perhaps in the end, even useful, by drastic reservations, or is it too fundamentally diseased to be salvaged at all?

There is no need of being taken in by the outcry that the Senate's delay is making matters worse in Europe. Whatever mischief there is or may be lies squarely at the door of the Peace Conference. The long and unnecessary blockade, the criminal folly in regard to Russia and Hungary, the unworkable treaty with Germany, the reckless aggrandizement of immature states in Central Europe, the endless intrigue in the Near East, and the crime against China—these are the things which keep Europe and Asia on the rack, and will continue to until they are corrected. If the settlement had any quality of permanence or good faith, if it *were* a settlement, then quick ratification all around would hasten the process of reconstruction. But as things stand in Europe, a panicky ratification by the Senate will not fundamentally improve the immediate situation, and ultimately it will make it much worse. Worse because America's obligation under the Covenant is so undefined, so open to dispute, so much a matter of temperament, that any European government which tries to shape policy in relation to it is building on sand.

For the more President Wilson talked at the Conference the more elusive the whole matter became. Article X contains an obligation, and a formula for fulfilling it. What is the obligation? Not, as most people have supposed, to defend against invasion; but to see to it that there is no change of boundaries because of an aggression. The League does not necessarily prevent war or the horrors of war; it prevents changes of boundaries or sovereignty if they occur as a result of aggression. *An armed intervention is still permissible* if it does not "destroy territorial integrity." The interventionist power must merely some time or other restore the territorial integrity and political independence of its victim. What President Wilson and his friends at Paris understand by restoration may be judged by Shantung. They think China's territorial integrity is "restored" even if Japan keeps control of the economic life of the province. This version of Article X is, we confess, new to us and infinitely more sinister than the old form. The usual interpretation was that all aggressive action was forbidden, and it was arguable that this did act as a protection of the weaker states even while it confirmed the Powers in possession of what they have. But here is what the President said:

> In the first place, I understand that no nation is at liberty to invade the territorial integrity of another.

But the word "invade" does not mean what the ignorant public thinks it does. Mr. Wilson continues:

> That does not mean to invade for purposes of warfare but to impair the territorial integrity of another nation.

Thus Germany did not invade Belgium in 1914 because Bethmann-Hollweg was ready to restore her. Germany only began to invade Belgium when she began to plan to annex Belgium. Mr. Wilson continues:

> Its territorial integrity is not destroyed by armed intervention; it is destroyed by retention, by taking territory away from it; that impairs its territorial integrity.

Now weak states do not intervene in strong states, so this article leaves the small state as much exposed as ever to intervention by which the great Power imposes its will upon the weak. How does Mr. Wilson's inside view of the article leave the relation between the great Powers? Simply here: they guarantee their boundaries to each other, as against all the rest of the world. Mr. Wilson's view of Article X is more shamelessly imperialistic than we had supposed it to be, for while it continues to protect the great Powers in the League, it deprives the small powers of that meagre protection which the Article did seem to offer.

That is where Mr. Wilson left the substance of the obligation. The next question is: How obligatory is this obligation? The discussion of this question was greatly confused by not holding clearly to a distinction. There are two obligations to be discussed. One is to respect and preserve, etc., etc. The other is to accept the advice of the Council as to how to preserve. It is clear that so far as the second goes, Congress may reject the advice of the Council. But having rejected it, that does not terminate the first obligation. Congress may refuse to send troops or warships or put embargoes in the way advised by the Council, but it must accomplish the same result then in some other way.

It was about the obligation to accomplish the result that the talk about morals and conscience turned. The Republicans argued that there was no pragmatic difference between a legal and a

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moral obligation. The President argued that there was. The difference was that in a moral matter the individual conscience operates, but that in law it does not. There is a loop-hole, in other words. We are bound only if our consciences tell us that we are bound in each crisis that arises. But if we feel that we are bound, then we are tremendously bound. The same is true, of course, for all the other members of the League. They also are bound only by their consciences.

Thus if Japan's conscience tells her that it is not necessary to respect the territorial integrity of China, even in the peculiar sense defined by the President, the whole obligation collapses. What a curious backbone, and what an infinity of misunderstandings it contains. You write a bold article which seems to promise everybody protection against invasion and dismemberment, and all the little nations are invited to snuggle up to it for security. Then you tell them that it does not protect them from invasion, and that it forbids dismemberment only in a moral sense. You inquire what a moral sense means and you discover that it means whatever any government thinks it means at any one moment.

On Mr. Wilson's analysis it is difficult to escape the conclusion that to its other sins this Covenant adds that of hypocrisy. No honest-minded statesman would say to the world: we guarantee your territorial integrity against external aggression, and then remark casually "that does not mean to invade for the purpose of warfare." Nor would any straightforward person write an unreserved promise into a public covenant, and then crossing his fingers, add under his breath: I'll carry this out if it seems right to me.

To be sure Mr. Wilson avers that his construction of the Covenant agrees with that of the European governments:

> The President: I am confident that was the view. That view was not formulated, you understand, but I am confident that that was the view.

Pressed to explain why these views should not be formulated, he said that though he differed from the Senators, "only as to the form of action" it would be a very serious practical mistake to formulate what Paris was supposed already to have agreed upon. Why would it be a mistake? Because Germany would have to acquiesce again "in a league the powers of which were differently construed." So we arrive at this: The Covenant means what Mr. Wilson says it does; but if you make the Covenant *say* what Mr. Wilson thinks it means, then its powers will be *differently* construed.

It is clear that the project was not thought out nor thought through. And we venture to suggest that if the Senators could cross-examine the members of the Peace Conference from other nations, they would find that there was no common interpretation of these obligations. Mr. Wilson's view of Article X differs radically from practically every other interpretation so far advanced. But we have had quite enough of agreements like the Lansing-Ishii, which mean one thing abroad and another at home. It will not bring order out of chaos for America to undertake an inchoate obligation, and the tradition of promising everything and meaning nothing might appropriately end before America is discredited as a loose talker throughout the world.

A Phantom for Actors

EVERYONE must agree that a moral promise is much more sublime than a legal promise. There is a gross circumstance about a legal promise which detracts from its sublimity and keeps it close to earth. A legal promise is between man and man, a moral promise between man and the Infinite, and what is more delightful than to be in tune with the Infinite? Consider the taxi cab. Once a taximeter comes into a cab, the noble exercise of conscience is taken away. This is lamentable. It is the weakness of human beings that stoops to legal obligation.

But low as the nature of a legal promise is, it is exceedingly important at this time to know exactly how to classify the assertion of theatrical managers like Messrs. Brady, Belasco and Cohan that they shall never produce another play if the Actors' Equity Association win the strike—never, never and never! Are these producing managers ready to put up their bond to this effect, or are they simply crossing their hearts? What is the precise nature of their promise? Can we depend on it? Will they make it explicit and coarse and binding, or is it only a promise in the eyes of God?

Because if we have the perfect guarantee of these producing managers, and managers like them, that they shall never produce again under given conditions, the fulfillment of those conditions becomes the one big object of the strike. If the day is here when Messrs. Brady and Belasco can actually talk of quitting the theatrical business, the Actors' Equity must fling aside every other consideration. On what terms will these managers quit and stay quit? They can have anything they like.

Without the producing managers the theater might be elevated beyond a business and a profession, beyond the occupation of shrewd promoters and beloved vagabonds, to an art and a religion

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scarcely conceivable now. Do the managers believe this? Not likely. When they talk of quitting altogether they do one of the most unkind of all imaginable things—they raise passionate expectancies which they have no intention of fulfilling. They paint a mirage on the sky. They picture an ocean of wine before wanderers in a desert of prohibition. They add insult to the hard injuries of this strike.

New York Labor's First Campaign

ON Saturday a new party entered the field of municipal politics in New York. Organized six months ago, the American Labor Party of Greater New York will make its first venture in the city elections of November—with a candidate for President of the Board of Aldermen. In its choice of campaign issues, its way of meeting them, and in the candidate it has chosen, the first performance of the Labor Party has encouraged those who believe that a union of workers of all classes for political action is essential to the achievement of a program of liberal reform.

As its first candidate the New York Labor Party has chosen a representative who is both trade unionist and public official. Mr. Thomas J. Curtis has for fourteen years been President of the Subway and Tunnel Constructors. The trade he followed is one in which working conditions are as bad as they well can be; and it is greatly to the credit of Mr. Curtis that he brought the working day from ten to eight hours, and the wage from $2.75 to $4. Three years ago, without surrendering his union affiliation, Mr. Curtis became Deputy State Industrial Commissioner—and in that office he has reviewed at least a thousand compensation cases a week—a position of unusual trust, involving each day a disbursement of some $35,000 of state funds. His post is one requiring insight and honesty in a high degree.

In contesting its first election the Labor Party does not appeal for the support of a single "class." The five issues chosen as a platform for the Fall campaign are of immediate importance not only to organized labor, but to the vast unorganized majority of New Yorkers who are working men and women. The party begins with proposals for meeting the high cost of living. And with admirable frankness it refuses to pretend—in the hope of catching votes—that it has any panacea that will instantaneously be effective. It has resisted the temptation even to imply that a vote for its candidate will at once bring down prices. What it does say is that the petty seizures and furious investigations of the Democrats and Republicans will never get anywhere—and that it pledges its candidate to work for such fundamental measures as the creation of a cooperative machinery of distribution and the operation of mines, railways, grain elevators and stockyards on a principle of public service.

Unemployment, says the Labor Party, is the cause of more suffering to the working population than any other single factor in our industrial system. But its effects do not stop there. Enforced idleness not only brings suffering to the workers and their families; by making the workmen lose in efficiency and in pride of workmanship, and by cutting down on production, it damages the public interest as well. Accordingly, while urging the adoption of unemployment insurance, of a policy of public works for crises in unemployment, and the establishment of a system of national employment exchanges, the party declares that the fundamental problem remains untouched by such measures. Only a thorough-going control over production, similar to the regulation of public utilities, can be expected to assure that continuous employment necessary both to producer and consumer.

Protests from all classes show that extortionate rents and a great shortage in living quarters are issues of first importance in the city today. The third plank in the Labor Party's platform goes behind rents and housing to the question of unused land. Private housing ventures, says the party, must support the heavy fixed charge of over-capitalized land, and every public housing project must fail, until the holding of unimproved or under-improved land out of the market has been effectively discouraged by taxation. Education is the fourth plank in the program—and the Labor Party pledges its candidate to stand out against further inquisition by the School Board into beliefs entirely personal to its teachers. Finally there is a plank devoted to the city's transportation problem. Three considerations, in the opinion of the Party, make public ownership of the street railway systems immediately desirable. In the first place, public interest—and not speculative schemes for enhancing the value of land held by railway directors—must plan the new extensions that will more and more be needed to relieve pressure in the city; then the roads themselves declare that only a fare increase for which the public must stand can enable them to do business on their present capitalization; and finally it is necessary at once to put an end to those strikes which are now the only means available to the workers in their efforts to secure a living wage, but which inevitably cause

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immense hardship for the public. For these reasons the party proposes a combination of government ownership with a system of management and control very similar to that now advocated for the national roads by the Railway Brotherhoods.

Despite the good faith of its program and its candidate, it will be no easy task for the Labor Party to register a large vote in the coming elections. At present the party is pitifully handicapped by a lack of funds. It has no real district organization. Its support is uncertain—for while the official local bodies of the American Federation of Labor are squarely behind it, certainly it will take time to carry the party to the rank and file of the whole trade union movement. But if the Labor Party has no machine, at least it possesses one asset to which neither of the old parties in New York can lay claim. It has integrity of purpose. And because it aims not at party spoils, but at the development of a democratic ideal, there will be liberals outside the trade union movement, as well as inside, who will turn to its standard.

Pursuing the Profiteers

BY all means let the profiteers be harried. We have always had them with us; we probably shall have them with us for a while, in spite of all the Department of Justice may do. But the profiteer hunt will help to destroy the illusion, if it persists anywhere, that great private wealth is in itself tangible evidence of great public service, or even of great natural ability.

That is a moral gain, but what the average American wants just now is something more tangible. He wants a material reduction in the cost of living. Some lucky individuals, no doubt, have seen their incomes rise more rapidly than the cost of living. That has been the case not only with those whose incomes are derived directly from the prices of goods, ever rising, like the growers of cotton and corn, but also of considerable classes of wage earners. But most workers, and most recipients of modest incomes of every other class, have found their position steadily deteriorating. They demand a change. If the prosecution of profiteers will turn the trick, good. If not, they will demand something else, and it will behoove our political leaders to meet that demand, unless they wish to see a great swing toward the Left in public sentiment, a great access in strength to those who believe that the free play of private interest has ceased to be a force which can be left to dominate the supplying of the peoples.

Now, there can be no doubt that a great many trading and manufacturing enterprises are today making profits far in excess of a legitimate reward for efficiency. The number of millionaires, it is widely believed, has doubled in the last five years. That may never appear in the income tax figures, but nobody supposes that the income tax meshes are tight enough to catch all the fish in the sea. The millionaires we already had have been greatly enriched, besides, and hosts of men who counted for nothing, financially, before the war, are now bulging pillars of bourgeois society, even if they are not quite millionaires. It is something of a scandal that we permitted all that. We should have instituted excess profits taxes earlier, and we should have made them heavy enough to scrape off practically the whole of the needless surplus. Then, if a business man had chosen to boost prices, he would have done so for the benefit of the public treasury, not for his own pocket. It is not too late, even today, to improve the excess profits tax. If that were done, whenever the consumer found himself forced to pay more for his bread or meat or coffee, he could have the satisfaction of foreseeing progress toward the payment of the public debt. This, however, is not among the measures recommended by President Wilson.

The trouble with the measure that the President has recommended, prosecution of the individual profiteer, is that there is no definite relation between the excessive prices that oppress the consumer and the excessive profits that build up great fortunes. One dealer slaps a profit of ten per cent on the goods that pass through his hands; another contents himself with five per cent. Is the former profiteering twice as savagely as the second? Nobody can say, without further facts. The first may turn over his stock once a month, the second once a week. At the end of a year the first may have far lower profits to show on his capital. The period of turnover varies with the product; it also varies with the location of the shop. How then do those efficient gentlemen of the federal and state departments arrive at their conclusions as to what is the day's fair price for flour, butter, eggs and all the other constituents of a domestic budget? They inquire of men who guess. It is worth noting that the tables of fair prices do not vary widely from the prices actually charged by the shops that are doing the most thriving business and making the most exaggerated annual profits.

But granted that some profiteers can be uncovered, and the jail or the threat of the jail can curb their avarice, what is the maximum relief we can expect? The administration has published its faith that the threat will do most of the work. Well, the threat is already exerting about all its

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influence. Prices are said to have come down one per cent. They may come down two per cent, or even three, on an average. Does anyone really expect a greater result from the profiteer hunt?

A three per cent reduction in cost of living, or a five per cent reduction, is practically nothing. It will not allay discontent anywhere. Neither will it allay discontent to prove in this way that the root cause of the evil transcends the personal greed of particular individuals. Inflated prices are in fact a world affair, not a national or local or personal. World causes have produced them: the destruction of productive property, the disorganization of industry, the excessive employment of credit financiering. Similar causes have produced similar effects in earlier periods of the world's history, and the present is probably not the last crisis of inflation. But does this mean that a state rationally governed will content itself with discovering that high prices and their causes are not to be mended by a few jail sentences? Not at all. The level of prices may be beyond our control, but there is no good reason why we should regard high prices as an evil in themselves. What is chiefly evil about the upward and downward vagaries of the price structure is the dislocation it produces in the fortunes of the smaller income classes. Let wages and small salaries rise or fall concurrently with prices and in the same degree, and the problem of prices would directly concern only those who have adequate reserves to take chances.

Wages do indeed rise with prices, but at a great interval, unless impelled upward by strike after strike. Salaries rise with prices, but at a much greater interval, and after shocking waste of trained ability through the retirement to other fields of the flower of the salaried personnel. As matters stand, the society in which we live is torn periodically by violent struggles having nothing to do with the fundamental distribution of the products of industry, but with mere mechanical readjustments to price changes. Is our social structure so tough that we can afford to expose it to such futile strains? Or had we not better take counsel as to how we may fence away the brute effects of price changes from the subsistence of the people?

That is the problem which must be solved, and solved quickly. For great as are the hardships resulting from the blind sport of rising prices, greater hardships are in store for us when the tide turns and prices drop ever to lower levels, closing down one shop after another while the streets are blocked with bread queues and mobs of rioting unemployed. That time will come, inevitably, unless our political leaders find the courage to attack the realities of the price problem.

Egypt at the Conference

EGYPT was part of the Turkish Empire before the war, and its status at the end was to be determined by the Peace Conference. Article twelve of the Fourteen Points said: "The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development."

To be sure, since 1840 Egypt's subservience to Turkey had been manifest chiefly in the payment of annual tribute and in recognition of the head of the Turkish Empire as head of the Ottoman Church. Nevertheless, Egypt was, in the strictest sense of the word, part and parcel of Turkey; and, had she fought on the side of Turkey in the war, as did other portions of the Turkish domains, she would have come before the Peace Conference as part of a conquered state. But Egypt did not fight for Turkey. On the contrary, she declared war on Turkey and on the Allies of Turkey. She contributed substantially to Allied success in the Near East. General Allenby paid a tribute to her "vital contribution" to the victory.

Article two of Mr. Wilson's Four Principles says: "Peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty, as if they were mere chattels, and pawns in a game." Article four says: "All well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism."

To the Egyptians these principles seemed to promise at least a hearing for a united people earnestly seeking the right to self-determination. True the Egyptians had been taught to be somewhat suspicious of British promises — for Britain had remained in military occupation of Egypt since 1882, despite repeated promises to withdraw. After the Anglo-French agreement of 1899 the British policy changed, and became one of indefinite occupation under the guise of protecting Egyptian interests. Then, in 1914, Britain declared a Protectorate over Egypt, promising that it would be for the duration of the war only. Egypt had learned that British statesmen do not always mean precisely what they seem to say, or, at any rate, that their statements are open to more than one construction.

But though suspicious of the good faith of the British Foreign Office, Egypt was nevertheless animated with the hope that a new era of world

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politics had been ushered in by the pronouncements of Mr. Wilson against the old order of secret intrigue and imperialistic ambitions. Hence, with the arrival of the armistice, her statesmen demanded the right to go to England and discuss arrangements for Egyptian independence. They also demanded that a delegation be allowed to participate in the peace deliberations. The first request was refused, or at least the British Foreign Office delayed so long that the proposal was made practically futile. For the purpose of carrying out the second proposal, the Egyptians had circulated petitions to get a direct mandate from the people to go to Paris. The British government forbade the circulation of these petitions, but not before they had already received two million signatures.

Obstruction on the part of the British then sought to checkmate every move of the Egyptians, and things went from bad to worse. Ruchdi Pasha, President of the Egyptian Legislative Council, resigned, and for months no one could be induced to supplant him, so great was popular indignation. On March 9th, four of the leaders of the delegation chosen to represent the people at Paris were arrested and deported to Malta. From this moment, the nationalistic movement, which had been orderly and constitutional, assumed a violent form. There were demonstrations—without arms, since the Egyptians had been totally disarmed. Egyptians refused to accept office in the government. There was a general strike, including governmental and municipal employees. The British government used violent repressive measures, but this practice only served to aggravate matters, and the whole of Egypt burst into revolt. Riots occurred daily; railroads were torn up; stations destroyed; telegraph lines cut, and Cairo isolated for some time from the rest of Egypt. The revolt was finally crushed by sheer force of arms, and General Allenby became Military Dictator. Not two score British were killed in the whole period of revolt. The British killed over 900 Egyptians, according to their own announcements. The relative losses betray an almost unbelievable ruthlessness in killing the unarmed natives. Finally, having secretly obtained from Mr. Wilson a recognition of the British Protectorate over Egypt—of which the Egyptians were not cognizant—the British authorities permitted the deported members of the delegation to proceed with their colleagues to Paris.

The Egyptian delegation reached Paris in April. It was composed of twenty members, fifteen of them Mohammedans, and five Christians. They were a modest, honest-appearing set of men, reasonably temperate in presenting their case, but fired with enthusiasm for their cause, and full of confidence that they would be able to win sympathy from unprejudiced judges. They never suspected that their case was already settled. Their only weapons were appeals to the Conference, and what publicity they could gain in the pages of the French socialist press.

It did not take the Egyptians long to discover that no amount of appealing would bring them before the Council of Five. So they sought access to Mr. Wilson, feeling confident he would throw his influence behind their claims, or at least examine their case on its merits. "Have confidence, gentlemen, in the Wilsonian principles," said Zaagloul Pasha, leader of the delegation.

On April 22nd the Egyptians wrote Mr. Wilson, thanking him for his championship of self-determination and asking for an interview. To this Mr. Wilson's secretary replied that he would bring the matter to the President's attention. Then, very suddenly, came announcement of the recognition by the United States of a British Protectorate. It was a thunderstroke to the Egyptians. They could not believe it. They waited eagerly for an official denial of the report. But no denial came.

The note in which Mr. Wilson recognized the Protectorate over Egypt contained this statement: "The President necessarily makes reservations as to the details, which will be the subject of a later discussion." And this, at least, left the Egyptians some hope that Mr. Wilson would accord them an interview, and that in his future deliberations he might thus have the benefit of information direct from the persons most vitally concerned. Accordingly they again wrote the President, urging the justice of their being granted a hearing. A brief reply from Mr. Wilson's secretary expressed "regret that the President's time has been so completely taken up that he has not had an opportunity to make an appointment to see you."

One more brief note from the Egyptians closed the episode. It gave the President a final opportunity to grant a hearing, by calling his attention to the fact that he had not excluded the possibility of a future interview, and by reminding him that the Egyptians at home would not be able to understand why their delegation had failed to obtain a hearing for their case, either from the Conference itself, or from that leader whose name had been an ideal and an inspiration—"the exponent of international right and justice."

But no reply was forthcoming—and the President departed, leaving unsatisfied and unheard the aspirations of the thirteen million Egyptian people. His failure, in the light of the practical difficulties he faced, is more easily to be explained than his

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failure to safeguard the rights of China. But a failure it remains—one more denial of the claim that a peace was made on the basis of the Fourteen Points. What Americans must chiefly regret is that never—in a conference to frame a new world peace—was Egypt permitted to state her case for self-determination.

Being Drastic With Mexico

THE plain American citizen would like to know what drastic change is impending in our relations with Mexico. Are we going to pursue bandits across the boundaries more promptly, or penetrate farther into Mexican territory? That would be no considerable innovation, and the intention might have been announced more courteously, in order that the protests from Mexico, inevitable under the formalities of international law, might also be couched in courteous terms. Are we going to place an embargo upon shipment of arms to Carranza while winking still more complacently upon the smuggling of arms to the bandits? Are we going to withdraw from Carranza the recognition which seems as yet to have done him very little palpable good? Are we going to cut off Mexico's foreign trade and thus postpone the day when it will be possible to pay foreign claims, including those of our own citizens? These are all expedients that seem not to measure up to the stern words of our State Department. Or are we going to intervene in earnest, and "straighten out Mexico?" That is the inference drawn by the men who have engaged most heavily in the propaganda for Mexican conquest. We can not accept it. Intervention in Mexico would be too costly, materially and morally.

Mexico, according to the naive imperialistic view, would be a magnificent prize. We may grant that Mexico possesses an incalculable wealth in mineral resources. She has more petroleum than any other country under the sun; she has vast potential riches in copper, silver and gold; her soil affords a prospect of remarkably flourishing agriculture. But also she has a teeming population, with a first claim upon her wealth production. Reduced to peonage, they might produce a considerable volume of profits for absentee capitalists. But the American democracy is not likely to tolerate for any long period the policy of imposing peonage upon another people for the benefit of a few millionaires, American or European. If we occupy Mexico we shall be forced sooner or later to administer it largely for the benefit of the Mexicans. And that means that we shall encounter great difficulty in making Mexico pay the costs of occupation. We did not recover the costs of occupying the Philippines, and we never shall, even if we hold the islands forever.

It is an open question whether Mexico would be so profitable to us as a morose ward as she would be as a friendly neighbor with which we might trade. But granted that in itself it would be more to our advantage to hold Mexico subject than to leave her free; nevertheless, Mexico is only a fragment of the Latin American world. It is a safe calculation that cordial economic relations with South America would be worth far more to us than any tribute we could exact from a conquered Mexico. And no one is so stupid as to suppose that the South American states would look on complacently while we swallowed one of their sister republics. Thereafter they would regard American commercial houses and American investments as means of "peaceful penetration," aimed at ultimate conquest.

We have dwelt upon the material costs, as is fitting in dealing with an enterprise which is proposed purely for the sake of gain. The advocates of intervention in Mexico do indeed sometimes prate sanctimoniously about our duty to bring order out of the Mexican chaos, as if the order established on the basis of alien bayonets could ever generate anything but a deeper chaos. They do indeed cry out in horror because Americans have been assaulted and murdered in Mexico, as if Americans had not been assaulted and murdered in Washington and Chicago. Such hypocrisy may salve their own consciences, but that is the limit of its functions. The real offenses of Mexico against humanity and America are four: oil, copper, silver and wide reaching ranches. We know that ourselves, and so does all the world.

And that is an indication of the moral cost America would incur in occupying Mexico. The European diplomats of the old school may not believe it, but the great mass of the American people were in earnest in their demand that this war should end war and the era of shameless aggressions upon the weaker peoples by the stronger. What has become of our moral case if we seize the first plausible pretext for falling upon a weaker neighbor whose possessions we covet?

If we occupy Mexico what can we in decency say about Ireland, Egypt, Persia? About the Saar valley? About Korea and Shantung? We can only mumble our approval of international affairs settled according to

> The good old way, the ancient plan,
> That he shall take who hath the might,
> And he shall keep who can.

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That Railroad Deficit

IN the railroad controversy of the next few months we will hear much of the so-called deficit which the Railroad Administration has achieved during the period of federal control. Editors are already proclaiming that the deficit has demonstrated the failure of government operation.

What is this deficit, and what is its significance? There is no doubt that it has been substantial. In the first full year of federal control it amounted to nearly $217,000,000. In the first six months of 1919, alone, it has been nearly a quarter of a billion. But is this figure in any sense a measure of inefficient operation?

The first point to bear in mind is that it is not accurately speaking a deficit at all. It does not mean that the railroads failed to meet their operating expenses, or even their ordinary fixed charges. The deficits which have been announced from month to month, and which have produced such joy in the anti-government ownership camp, merely represent the amount by which the railroads, considered as a financial unit, have failed to earn the liberal returns which the government has guaranteed. In taking over the railroads, the government guaranteed to the railroad corporations the average net operating revenue of the three preceding years. In the aggregate these three years were relatively prosperous. One of them was a banner year. The " deficit " is merely the amount by which earnings have failed to come up to this liberal three-year average.

The second point to remember is that a reduction in earning was fully expected when the railroads were taken over, indeed this expectation was one of the principal reasons for a government guarantee. The latter part of 1917, it will be recalled, was a period of great anxiety in railroad circles. The severe winter brought extraordinary operating costs. Prices of materials had already started on their upward course. Labor was getting restless, and was already formulating demands for higher wages to meet the increased cost of living. Railroad securities were falling. It was feared that reduced earnings would precipitate a collapse of railroad securities which would seriously embarrass many financial institutions, at the very time when the success of war financing depended on their stability. It was to protect the railroads from almost inevitable financial disaster that the government assumed responsibility for railroad earnings and operations. It is with bad grace that the editorial protagonists of the railroad corporations are now attacking the government because it has had to make good this guarantee at the expense of the taxpayer.

But if the government was operating the railroads, is it not to blame for not making as good a financial showing as the railroads made in the three previous years of private operation? Are not earnings a test of efficiency in business, and does not the so-called deficit measure the difference in efficiency between government operation and private operation? A simple analysis of the leading factors affecting railroad earnings will show that the deficit means nothing of the kind.

The largest single item in railroad operating expenses is the pay-roll. On May 25, 1918, the Railroad Administration granted a wage increase, in the form of a percentage increase over the wages prevailing on January 1, 1916. The award was so graded that the lower paid employees (more than half the total number), received increases of from 41 to 43 per cent, while for the more highly paid the percentage decreased gradually as the wage increased. The locomotive engineer, for instance, with a pre-war wage of $170 a month, received an increase of only a fraction over 12 per cent above the January 1, 1916 level, while the employee with a pre-war wage of $250 a month received no increase. Since then there have been in addition some minor increases and adjustments. Moreover application of the eight-hour principle has resulted in putting more men on the pay-roll. The net result, according to Director General Hines, has been an increase in the total payroll since the beginning of 1917, of about 50 per cent.

The next largest item is the cost of materials, such as fuel, steel rails, cross-ties, lumber and steel for car and locomotive repairs, and similar commodities. The enormous increase in the price of these articles is matter of common knowledge. Mr. Hines has estimated that the materials which the Railroad Administration has to buy cost from 50 to 70 per cent more than they cost at the beginning of 1917.

When critics of the Railroad Administration point to the so-called railroad deficit as proof of inefficiency do they mean that the Administration should not have paid these higher wages or increased material prices? As to materials, there has been no suggestion that excessive prices have been paid. Indeed in the recent controversy over steel prices the Railroad Administration was severely criticized for attempting to break down the price level which another branch of the government, the Department of Commerce, was trying to maintain. And coal operators have indignantly accused the Railroad Administration for using its concentrated buying power to beat down the price of coal. As to the wage increase, for many employees it did not even attempt to make

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good the higher cost of living since the beginning of 1916. A scientific inquiry indicated to the wage commission appointed by Mr. Meadow, that the cost of living had increased about 40 per cent for employees receiving about $85 a month, and more for those receiving less. This increase the new wage scale tried to meet as nearly as possible. But the wages of the more highly paid employees were not increased in proportion to the cost of living. The purchasing power of their wages was less after the wage increase than it had been in the beginning of 1916 at the old wage level.

On the score of either wages or material prices, then, no valid ground for criticism has been shown.

But, it is said, there has been an increase in freight and passenger rates which was intended to counterbalance the large expense. True, but the increase was insufficient to meet the increase in operating expenses. Passenger rates, which bring in about a quarter of the total operating revenue, were raised about 33 1-3 per cent, excepting commutation rates, which were raised only 10 per cent. Freight rates were increased about 25 per cent. Moreover the increase in passenger rates did not take effect until June 10, 1918, and the freight rate increase until June 25, 1918, whereas the principal wage increase was retroactive to the first day of January. For nearly six months the Railroad Administration was paying war-time wages and charging pre-war rates. In these factors lies the obvious explanation of the so-called deficit of 1918, an explanation which is in no way discreditable either to the Railroad Administration or to the principle of government operation.

On the 1919 revenues, however, the higher freight and passenger rates have had their full effect. Why, then, has the deficit continued, nay more than doubled? Because another factor has entered into the situation. With the signing of the armistice came an abrupt decline in the amount of freight offered for shipment. In the first few months of 1919 about a third less freight was offered for shipment than in the last few months of 1918. Recent months have shown an improvement, but the amount of traffic is still far below the war standard. As the amount of traffic decreases, of course gross revenues decrease correspondingly; but expenses do not decrease correspondingly. It is estimated that only about one-third of a railroad's expenditures is affected by the volume of traffic. Two-thirds must be incurred in full whether traffic is large or small. Obviously, therefore, a sharp decline in the volume of traffic will seriously diminish net earnings.

Would the critics have us believe that the Railroad Administration is to blame for this decline in traffic? We can conceive of only one way in which the Railroad Administration could substantially affect the volume of traffic. It could fix rates so high that some of the traffic would cease to move. But railroad officials who criticize the Administration for its deficits in the same breath criticize it for not raising rates sufficiently to meet expenses. Railroad rates are now lower, in proportion to the price of commodities, than they have ever been. Clearly the decline in the volume of traffic is due to courses beyond the Railroad Administration's control.

These three factors,—a large increase in wages and material prices, a proportionately smaller increase in freight and passenger rates, and in 1919 an abrupt decline in traffic,—are in themselves an ample prima facie explanation of the so-called deficit. They do not, of course, prove by themselves that the railroads have been as efficiently handled as under private management. But neither have the critics of the Railroad Administration, who loudly proclaim the failure of government operation, submitted a single substantial proof of inefficiency. All they have done has been to repeat parrot-like the traditional arguments against government ownership, and then exhibit the deficit as a substantiation of these arguments.

Railroad officials who point with scorn at the government's railroad deficit should be called upon to particularize their indictment. Do they mean that wages paid by the government are too high? If so, do they intend to reduce wages if the railroads are turned back to them? Or can they eliminate the deficit only by greatly increasing passenger and freight rates? If so, how large an increase will they demand? Perhaps an answer to these questions will cause Congress and the President to hesitate before sanctioning the return of the railroads to private operation on January 1, 1920.

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EDITORS
HERBERT CROLY — FRANCIS HACKETT
PHILIP LITTELL — ALVIN JOHNSON
WALTER E. WEYL — WALTER LIPPMANN
CHARLES MERZ
SIGNE TOKSVIG, Assistant Editor

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Assuming We Join

JUST as reaching your twenty-first birthday throws no light on how to act in order to reduce the cost of living, so discovering that our isolation is over is no indication of a policy. Yet each day men appear in print to say that such and such an alliance is necessary, that troops must be dispatched to some point in Europe or Asia, "because our isolation is over." It does not follow. You might as well argue that John must vote for Mayor Hylan because John has a vote.

There has been an important change. Before the war the area of our interest lay in the Americas, the Pacific, and eastern Asia. The United States was in contact with European diplomacy whenever that diplomacy affected those regions of the globe. As a result of the war the areas of interest have been enlarged, and America is intermittently in contact from Brest to Vladivostok. These new contacts, their depth, their purposes, their obligations are the substance of what we call "the end of American isolation," and the definition of these meanings is the significant task. For granting that "isolation" is over, we have still to find out what it is that has begun.

"It has come about by no plan of our conceiving," says Mr. Wilson, "but by the hand of God, who led us into this way. We cannot turn back. We can only go forward with lifted eyes and freshened spirit, to follow the vision." But this is a little like saying to a person aged twenty-one, "You have reached maturity. You cannot turn back. Go forward and follow the vision." To which the new voter will reply if he is worthy of his vote: "What vision, and whither?" As a practical matter the vision is appropriated by those who have a particular project in mind. The vision is what they think ought to be done, and one of the most serious aspects of the new dogma of non-isolation is that it so easily becomes a form of fatalism. The old dogma at least had the virtue of landmarks. It told us a little of where we were and why. The new dogma can easily become just a general drift, and that, I think, is what it has become within the last year. Having learned that we must "participate," we are forgetting to specify. We are resolved to take part in world affairs, but in our exhilaration we are inclined to omit the inquiry as to what part.

Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points and his other principles were a vague attempt to define that part. But they did not operate at any significant point, and in the actualities of Europe they are only a memory and a catch cry. Yet we continue to "take part." We are about to join a League in which we take part continuously and regularly, but the part we are to take is shrouded in utter mystery. Does anybody know what the American representative at Geneva is to stand for? Yet that is the crucial question. It underlies all the mumbling and stuttering about "reservations," for reservations are nothing but a left-handed way of setting some limits and fixing a few guide posts by which participation is to be directed. They are purely negative. They will tell what our representative must not do. They will not give him any lead as to what he ought to do. Within whatever limits the Senate may fix, the American delegate will go to Geneva with a mind that is not only open but empty. No doubt he will be instructed to work for justice and peace. But he will be a remarkable man indeed if those instructions help him much. For such words are hollow vessels into which almost anybody can pour almost anything he chooses.

A nation, determined to participate but undetermined as to what it wants, is gullibility itself. Its role will be that of reinforcement for the Powers which can most effectively secure the attention of its representative. And the experience of Paris shows that the high motive of not wanting anything in particular easily degenerates into the complacency of not wanting anything very much. Italy and Japan, France and England were ready to wreck the Conference for a port, a bit of land, a sum of money. They were insistent and they prevailed. But Mr. Wilson, who wanted "nothing" but a peace that could last, could risk nothing and therefore could not be insistent.

At bottom neither he nor anyone else took his altruism very seriously. He had not convinced himself, he had not convinced the American people, that his so-called idealism was as vital an American interest as any strategic frontier in Europe or concession in Asia. He had said many times, but he had never digested the idea, that a stable peace in Europe is the first and most important line of defence for the American democracy, that a democratic settlement there meant more to the security and prosperity of Americans than anything else in the world. But such considerations were not decisive. American idealism at Paris was that of Lady Bountiful, a luxury of the comfortable and well-to-do, not part of the serious business of life.

Now the reason that sophisticated European democrats based such extravagant hopes on Ameri-

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can intervention was not because of Mr. Wilson's words. It was because they saw, more accurately than anyone who directed American policy, that the substantial realization of Mr. Wilson's program was a vital American interest. They hailed him, because for the first time within memory it happened through a fortunate series of circumstances, that the real interests of a great Power coincided with the hopes of the European democracies. They assumed that he understood this, and that in standing resolutely for the American interest, he would concurrently be supporting them in their struggle against the jingoes and the military cliques.

But in the test, the American program was treated like so many other ideals, as something distant, unrelated, and of no material consequence. Calling ourselves disinterested, we behaved as if we were uninterested, and furnished the world with the extraordinary spectacle of a nation willing to send two million soldiers overseas, yet unwilling to project its mind and conscience overseas. Naturally, American prestige declined steadily at Paris. When Mr. Wilson began, Europe believed that the Wilson programme was an American programme, a thing as vital to us as Alsace-Lorraine was to France. But in the course of time the European statesmen discovered that Mr. Wilson's program was really nothing more than his gratuitous advice in a situation he did not thoroughly understand.

If America were intending now to withdraw from all further European responsibilities, the analysis of Mr. Wilson's defeat at Paris would be of merely historical interest. But under the Covenant we engage ourselves to participate in all the intricacies of the whole world, and it is of the utmost importance that we should try to understand why in our first great experiment in participation, the results are so little like the promises. Assuming that we join the League, assuming that the League operates from the Treaties of Versailles, what is to come next? It is a question of aims and of methods, and the two cannot be separated, for the method will in the end determine the result.

WALTER LIPPMANN.

Barbusse in Peace and War

AMERICANS consumed Under Fire by the tens of thousands; thrilled, throbbed, and ached over it; went the full length of its implication that all was wrong with the world; and would, perhaps, have fallen into its melancholia had they not set about putting things to rights.

What will they make of the stories written in peace times by the same author—such as those in We Others? It is a safe wager that these have already brought a fall in the American market for Barbusse.

Not that Americans do not appreciate the artist in the Frenchman. For instance, this—"the little house with a hat of thatch and a feather of smoke in it." Incomparably French! Or the ingenuity that Barbusse displays in preparing a surprise. Every story springs a surprise. Unfortunately when many such stories, published at different times, are collected in one volume the very inevitability of the shock prepares one for it; it becomes a matter of course. To an Anglo-Saxon, furthermore, whose favorite stories are not likely to be dependent upon surprise, this element may seem not only monotonous but unnatural—untrue to life.

It is not, however, the technique of Barbusse that concerns us here; it is his outlook on life. How will our countrymen react to peace time stories steeped in the philosophy of life reflected in Under Fire? Imagine the average reading American settling down for an evening with, let us say, We Others, unsustained by an academic interest in literary genealogy, in classicism, romanticism, realism, symbolism, or any other "ism" whatsoever; incurious about the decadence, anaemia, neurasthenia, hysteria, or other ailments that the diagnosticians have fastened upon the body—we had almost said the corpse—of modern French literature. What will our average readers do with such a collection of stories written in peace times as We Others?

He closes Book One—ten stories of Fate's interference in the affairs of men. These stories are sad. The most cheerful of them is the story of the release of a very upright pastor from a sense of mortification and of personal sin upon the discovery that his father had been not a suicide but a victim of paint poisoning. No; one moment: there is the story of the shock suffered by a retired General upon returning to his home town to find all of his generation dead. That emanates, perhaps, a ruddier glow, a more cheerful warmth. A fatal accident of war, a judicial crime, two cases of manslaughter, the attempted assassination of a man already slain, and two murders result in nineteen known dead. This casualty list, however, is not

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complete. Indeed we cannot compute the total correctly because the author fails to set down the number of victims of a Fenian bomb outrage that blows up a whole guard-house of soldiers. A serious omission, but not our fault.

The average reader may not be discouraged by these fatalities. In the first place, Fate is generally shown in her tragic role. In the second place, the depression that is the natural result of such a large number of deaths is somewhat offset by what to an American sounds like a cheerful note. This note seems to me no other than the robustious blast of Rudyard Kipling. Certainly Barbusse has many of the Kipling stimuli that sustain one through the heaviest carnage. His narrators tip you a wink with easy familiarity; treat flippantly all things, both great and small; throw off vague generalizations and elliptical speculations, which flatter by inviting you to fill out the gap in the thought. They talk exuberantly, with a free use of the bizarre, of overstatement and understatement, of the drummer's cock-sure intimacy, with a wealth of technical detail. Like Kipling, Barbusse is at home in many lands. He even sounds the Pax Britannica that breathes o'er the spacious times of good King Rudyard. American optimism,—which, foreigners say, robs us of all chance of a literature,—will not endure a grief that breeds despondency; but it will weep copiously and happily withal when sustained by a buoyancy like that of Rudyard Kipling.

Presumably, then, it is in a dampened but still hopeful mood that our average American reader reaches Book Two: The Madness of Loving. The very title cheers him. No group of stories dealing with the most delightful of all diseases could be entirely joyless.

He finishes the stories of the madness of love. And these tales are sad. Mismatings, desertions, treachery, infidelity, and to spare, of course. Such are the fruits of love madness. He expects them, especially in a Frenchman. Even a serious treatment of marital infidelity confessed in the sixties and seventies he can stand. Consider, however, such themes as the separation of an aged couple by death, a declaration of love postponed too late, the realization of a settled couple that they no longer understand why they ever billed and cooed, the confessions by elderly ladies of their former approaches to the brink of indiscretion—with the lawn of an insane asylum for a confessional—stories such as these need not act as depressants. Their melancholy might gently effervesce in an atmosphere of tender sentiment. To be sure Barbusse charges them with melancholy, and enough of it; but it is the kind that lingers like midsummer heat.

Let us take, for instance, The Way They Went, the story of a couple so wrapped up in each other that they were unconscious of the world around them. Returning one evening from their employments in the town nearby, they walked through the ashes of their home, burned down during their brief absence, without even noticing that the house was no longer there. They just kept on walking. Surely there is a spark of encouragement for mankind in such an affection. Not as Barbusse presents it. By some subtle magic that defies our analysis Barbusse leaves you with the creeps, as though his couple were walking through the ashes of the world you live on.

"But why—why," asks our average reading American, "is there no joy, none, anywhere in these eighteen tales of mad love?" If he has had a touch of this insanity, himself, he will be ready to swear that love madness in the life outside the stories of M. Barbusse begets joy as well as sorrow, that Barbusse is not true to this life, that he presents but a single side of it, and that this side is the one the American prefers to skip in his reading moments.

And yet what else could be expected of a writer whose only story of young love in the mad happiness of mutual declaration has for its point the fact that this declaration takes place in a cemetery on a rainy day, draws cheer from a passing funeral procession, and faces unfalteringly a future of grinding poverty with crabbed parents to support!

There are other deeps to plumb—Book Three: Pity. For these tales, also, are sad. "Naturally," you say? Yes; but the American will find here a pity foreign to his taste. The pity he is accustomed to, from Shakespeare to J. M. Barrie, purges his emotions without destroying his confidence in life—its joy, its reward, its ultimate rightness. This pity does not shake his conviction that, by and large, life is not an affliction to be endured but an opportunity to be seized. The literature he has been brought up on does not, as a rule, present the pitiful unaccompanied and unrelieved by a hopeful outlook on life. This literature stirs pity *and* soothes it, save when it reflects a peculiar sickness, as in the mopings of the young Byron, or a peculiar philosophy of life, such as Hardy's fatalistic deism, or a peculiar technique, like that of the ultra radical realists.

Now, these stories of pity that Barbusse has written either throw a pitiful object against a pitiless world or reveal pity awakening in a hardened nature (the awakening is generally caused by a stroke of apoplexy—a rather radical cure). In both cases the reader is led to turn from the pity of a particular instance to face the pity of life in general.

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Such a quality of pity may be typical of modern French literature or it may be exceptional in it: that is not our present concern. In English literature such pity is exceptional, and it is on English literature that the American reader is reared. He meets in Barbusse a kind of pity that for him is even more of a depressant than a purgative, and, therefore, distasteful. He turns away from it with the feeling that these stories of pity do not match experience.

And he will turn away from the whole of such a collection of stories as We Others with the same feeling. You cannot make him believe that Fate always works unhappily, that the madness of love always ends tragically, that pity always remains unconsoled—in short, that life is such a desperately sad affair. The pessimism in which Under Fire is steeped is justified by the catastrophic nature of the war that gave it birth. The average American will accept that pessimism as a war product, but he will not accept it in peace. It does not match his experience—actual or imaginative. He will "pass it up."

JOHN MANNING BOOKER.

On American Philosophy

I

The Idealistic Tradition and Josiah Royce

THAT philosophy must always reflect the general conditions of the country in which it arises, is today a widespread and unquestioned dogma. But it is one of those pieties to which people always pay an introductory homage and which has little influence on their subsequent proceedings—like the chaplain's prayer which opens a political convention. In the case of the history of philosophy, I think both the pious dogma and its practical disregard are equally sound. It would be vain to deny that philosophy or any other human activity is influenced by the conditions of the life which gives it birth; but in the absence of genuine knowledge of the complex and illusive causes which produce or guide philosophic genius, it is foolish to pretend that we can tell what kind of a philosophy will inevitably appear under a given set of historical conditions. Hence, scientifically trained historians of philosophy instinctively avoid explaining individual philosophical doctrines as due to general political, geographic, or economic "forces." The attempt, some years ago, at an economic interpretation of the history of philosophy by an industrious and perversely ingenious Greek, proved a veritable reductio ad absurdum of the whole method of the economic interpretation of history. Creative imagination, supreme courage, and unfailing passion for truth, the essential qualities of great philosophic achievement, are gifts of the gods ("accidental variations," if you prefer modern terminology), and are present or absent in all sorts of times and places. Nor can it be successfully denied that philosophy at its best fixes its attention not so much on local and temporary conditions, as on the ever present issues of life and death, the meaning of happiness, suffering, love and justice, the fundamental constitution of the human mind and the great facts of nature which form its cosmic background. But we must distinguish between philosophy as original vision and philosophy as organized doctrine or tradition. The vision of the great seers is brought home to the great mass of humanity by a large number of intellectual middlemen, commentators and expositors who form sects or schools that live by and for the perpetuation of certain traditions. It is the life of these traditions that depends upon the general historical conditions which mould the intellectual life of any country or epoch.

The traditions of American philosophy have always been predominantly British and until very recently almost exclusively theologic. French and German influences, to be sure, have not been completely absent. The community of western civilization which found in Latin its common tongue has never been completely destroyed. But in philosophy as well as in law and literature the tie of a common language has proved stronger than a Declaration of Independence and two wars; and though our clergy long ago ceased to be the nation's leaders, they have continued their grip on the American colleges, including even those that do not openly profess to be denominational. So long as the intellectual history of America continues to be an unexplored region we can but conjecture as to why there has been so little American philosophy outside of the theological seminaries and their college annexes. Our absorption in the material conquest of a vast continent, the ruin of the older southern seaboard aristocracy that kept in touch with French liberal thought and the triumph, of the anti-intellectual evangelical revivalist wave may be among the causes; but the fact can hardly be disputed that our philosophy has in the main

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been a branch of Christian apologetics. Though living in a political democracy our clerical philosophers were the courtiers of a celestial monarchy who in the absence of any grave open revolt against the throne could only engage in factional or sectarian disputes. Their complete absorption in traditional theologic issues seems to be the only explanation of the astounding fact that in the face of unique political experience we have, apart from some pages in Calhoun, produced almost nothing in the way of original contributions to political theory. In spite of violent dogmatic assertions to the contrary, history shows that great and stirring events do not always arouse great thoughts.

Writing in 1879 Stanley Hall drew a disheartening picture of the dismal unenlightenment that then characterized philosophic teaching in American colleges. The minutiae of sectarian controversy crowded out liberal humanistic interests, and zeal for narrow orthodoxy prevented the genuinely free inquiry that is the life of philosophic endeavor. There was little true appreciation of the world's great historic streams of reflective thought; and the contemporary evolutionary philosophy which was stirring men's minds outside of the colleges was either complacently rejected or else sterilized by being harmonized with Scripture in the manner of the text-books' gospel harmony. But a change had already begun, signalized by the election of a layman to the presidency of Harvard College and by the opening of our first real university, Johns Hopkins. As the American colleges began to expand and as training for the educational profession became an important consideration, teachers of philosophy began to be selected with some regard for professional training and competency rather than exclusively for piety and pastoral experience.

Such professional training an increasing number obtained in Germany, where, if they did not always get much fresh wisdom, they did generally learn the meaning of scientific accuracy in experimental psychology and philologic accuracy in the history of philosophy. It was through these men that the idealism of Kant and Hegel, as developed by British writers like Green, Bradley and Bosanquet, replaced the older Scottish common sense realism as the basis of our academic philosophy. The older school could not hold its own before the superior dialectical skill and technical equipment of the new generation. While the newer men were more secular and less aggressively theistic they had to be welcomed as allies in the fight against the scientific positivism and popular agnosticism that was growing up outside of the colleges, through the influence of non-academic men like Mill, Buckle, Spencer, Tyndall and Huxley who were read in this country even more widely than in England.

Of the later and more liberal movement to defend the theistic or Christian view of the world on the basis of dialectic arguments that could profess a wholehearted acceptance of modern physical and biologic science, Josiah Royce was by far the most brilliant mind. But he was too big a mind to remain completely within a tradition. His devotion to the study of the logic of modern science and his zeal for truth, which was at least as strong as his devotion to the doctrine of idealism, led him to continual revision of his views; and while he always remained in the bosom of the idealistic faith, his work was largely instrumental in preparing the way for the reaction against idealism which has taken place in our own day.

Unlike most of America's distinguished philosophers, Josiah Royce was not brought up in New England. He was born in a mining town in California and received his philosophic education in the university of his own state, at Johns Hopkins and at Göttingen, where he studied under Lotze. Many diverse elements thus stimulated his subtle and acquisitive mind to philosophic reflection; the theistic evolutionism of the geologist Le Conte, the fine literary spirit of E. R. Sill, and his own reading of Mill and Spencer as well as of the great German philosophers. In the end, however, he owed most to Charles S. Peirce, the most original, fertile mind that American thought has as yet produced.

Called to Harvard at twenty-seven, his prodigious learning, keen and catholic appreciation of poetry, and the biblical eloquence with which he expressed a rich inner experience, at once made a profound impression. His singularly pure and loyal, though shy, spirit attracted a few strong friendships; but his life at Cambridge was in the main one of philosophic detachment. As a citizen of the great intellectual world, however, he closely followed its multitudinous events; and his published books only partly reflected his unusually active and varied intellectual interests. In his earliest published papers he is still somewhat agnostic and follows Kant in denying the possibility of ultimate metaphysical solutions except by ethical postulates, but in his first book, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (1885) he comes out as a full-fledged metaphysical idealist claiming to prove beyond doubt the existence of an Absolute Self in whom we all move and have our being. This brilliant book at once made a profound impression, especially with the arguments that the very possibility of error cannot be formulated except in terms of an absolute truth or rational totality which requires an absolute knower. Like the parts of a sentence, all things

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find their condition and meaning in the final totality to which they belong. The world must thus be either through and through of the same nature as our mind, or else be utterly unknowable. But to affirm the unknowable is to involve one's self in contradictions. Royce delights in these sharp antitheses and the reduction of opposing arguments to contradictions.

In his next book the eloquent though somewhat diffuse Spirit of Modern Philosophy (1892), the element of will rather than knowledge receives the greater emphasis. The Berkleyan analysis of the world as composed of ideas is taken for granted, but the emphasis is rather on the nature of the World Mind or Logos. Following Schopenhauer, he points out that even in the idealistic view of the world there is an irrational element, namely, the brute existence of just this kind of a world. The great and tragic fact of experience is the fact of effort and passionate toil which never finds complete satisfaction. This eternal frustration of our ideals or will is an essential part of spiritual life, and enriches it just as the shadows enrich the picture or certain discords bring about richer harmony. The Absolute himself suffers our daily crucifixion, but his triumphant spiritual nature asserts itself in us through that very suffering. This profoundly consoling argument which both elevates us and sinks our individual sorrows in a great cosmic drama is, of course, an expression of the historical Christian wisdom of the beatitude of suffering. But it offended the traditional individualism which finds its theologic and metaphysical expression in the doctrine of free will. If each individual is a part of the divine self, how can we censure the poor wretch who fails to live up to the proper standard? It is significant of the unconventionality of Royce's thought that he never attached great importance to the question of blame or the free and intentional nature of sin.

The evils which are uppermost in his mind are those resulting from ignorance, from the clumsiness of inexperience rather than from wilful misdeeds; and, unlike most American philosophers, he rightly saw that the religious conscience of mankind has always regarded sin as something which happens to us even against our will. Against the complacent belief of the comfortable that none suffers or succeeds except through his own sins or virtues, Royce preached the view of St. Paul that we are all members of each other's bodies. "No man amongst us is wholly free from the consequences or from the degradation involved in the crimes of his less enlightened or less devoted neighbours, the solidarity of mankind links the crimes of each to the sorrows of all."

As a son of the far west who not unjustly referred to himself as a non-conformist and a rebel, Royce was always keenly alive to the claim of human individuality. In his metaphysical magnum opus, The World and the Individual, he brought forth many ingenious arguments to reconcile the existence of an absolute Self with the genuine individuality of our particular finite selves. But the dominating and growing influence of the thoughts suggested to him by Peirce led Royce to lay ever increasing emphasis on the social nature of intellectual and religious, as well as moral concepts; so that in his last important book, The Problem of Christianity, all the dogmas of Pauline Christianity become doctrines of social psychology and the Absolute or the personality of Christ does not appear at all except as the spirit of the beloved community. The influence of Peirce who was a realist of the type of Plato and Dun Scotus made itself felt just as strongly in Royce's mathematico-logical work which largely occupied him in the last twenty years of his life. Instead of viewing logic in the traditional idealistic manner as dealing with the laws of thought he deals with it rather as a part of the most general science of objective order.

Royce never consciously gave up his idealism but it is really difficult to reconcile the realistic logic and social psychology which he got from Peirce with the Berkeleyan idealism which rests on the nominalistic dogma that only particular ideas have true existence. The idealistic tradition still is and perhaps will long continue to be the prevailing basis of philosophic instruction in America. But it is just a tradition that occasionally finds brilliant apologies but does not produce any specific contribution to the progress of philosophic thought. So far as Royce's work has provided a basis whereon others could continue to build—as it has shown itself in the social psychology of Baldwin and in the recent masterly survey of Symbolic Logic by Lewis—it is really independent of the idealistic tradition. Indeed, by his ethical (as opposed to psychologic) idealism and by his studies in mathematical logic Royce fashioned some of the most effective tools wherewith pragmatists like James and neo-realists like Holt were able to free themselves from the idealistic tradition entirely. Royce's profound and loyal devotion to the ethical interests of humanity did not prevent him from regarding a question like that of human immortality as one to be settled by reason "in precisely the same sense in which the properties of prime numbers and the kinetic theory of gases are matters for exact investigation." In this way he continued to represent, against the growing tide of anti-intellectualism, the old faith in the dignity and potency of reason which is the corner stone of humanistic liberalism.

MORRIS R. COHEN.

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Democracy and Jim-Crowism

THE Negro, we have been told, is an inferior race. Challenged, his critics have insisted that his achievements belong in the lower intellectual reaches. His sense of rhythm which produced ragtime, his patience and docility, have been made into weapons by his critics. But remarkably little investigation worthy of the name of science has been conducted to show how, if at all, the Negro race is inferior. Sir Sidney Olivier has more than suggested that the Negro's lack of adaptability to certain industrial processes is in itself a criticism of the white man's submission to modern civilization.

That civilization in its recent phases has challenged the Negro. The Negro has replied by posing a question which it will take centuries perhaps to answer. Civilization called upon the Negro to learn to die—not in despair, not as a matter of course, but militant in defense of a concept all too abstract from his own existence. More particularly, the United States government called upon the Negro to die for democracy. It spent enormous effort in making that concept a reality to men who were to offer themselves in sacrifice to it. And although the Negro has fought in every American war from the pre-Revolutionary campaigns against aboriginal Americans, this latest war was most distinctively educative. In it the Negro was called upon as a citizen and as a member of a race to do what all other citizens had to do. Responding under the special stimulus of the disabilities attached to his color, he learned his lesson better, perhaps, than did his comrades. He learned what war so anomalously teaches: that civilization is built upon the preference of general and abstract concepts to individual impulses and individual lives. That lesson is most destructive of caste and caste privileges.

The war was not only an education, it proved to be an opportunity. Of the half million Negroes who by conservative estimate came North, many merely took the occasion industry offered to leave the South. Labor agents from industrial centres deprived of European immigration induced some Negroes to come North. Some came without solicitation other than the lure of higher wages and better living. But many had long wanted to leave the South because they had found life intolerable there. How these elements were distributed it is impossible to say. In any event, the migrant Negroes were leaving a civilization in which caste, a passionate defense of "racial purity" by white men, reenforced by terrorism and violence or threats, kept them a source of easily exploitable labor. The kindly and paternal attitude of many white men, so often mentioned in extenuation, does not alter the essential facts.

The consequences of the migration were manifold. Special problems of all sorts were created in the North. For the first time in the past few years the question of segregation of white and colored people in residence districts and of their children in schools was presented in northern industrial cities like Chicago. Acute conflict as in East St. Louis came about between labor unions of white men and the, for the most part, unorganized migrant Negroes. But these local conditions were incidental. Everywhere the Negro was increasing his stakes in American life. Wages went up for him in the South as much by reason of the war service and migration of white men as by circumstances affecting Negroes only. The South was aghast at losing its chief labor—an ironic reversal of the feeling in post-Civil War days when the states looked with distrust and disfavor upon the presence within their borders of free men of color. This change of status created resentment in the South. Animus was directed especially against the Negro soldier, embodiment of the joint guardianship of and participation in that abstract democracy for which the Negro was giving his life and buying bonds. Negro soldiers were accused of having consorted with white women in France and the entire race was charged with manifestation of a new intractable spirit of aggression and independence. Lynching flourished during the war and especially after the armistice. The resentment so engendered found its easiest expression in charges of criminality against the Negro race.

This has long been the excuse for the treatment accorded the Negro in certain sections of the South. A newspaper propaganda featuring the word Negro in the headlines reporting crimes was responsible for the Atlanta riots some thirteen years ago. The same sort of propaganda occasioned the attacks upon Negroes in Washington. If the Washington race riots were of the passional type not directly traceable to economic causes, the Chicago disorders were directly traceable to industrial circumstances. In Washington it was a case of "teaching the damned nigger his place." In Chicago primitive hatred for the unfamiliar was stimulated by real estate manipulations, corrupt policing and political alliances, and resentment of white union workers in the stockyards against non-union Negroes. One race riot was southern in type, the other northern. The Washington riots were like those of Atlanta. Chicago's resembled those of East St. Louis. With this important difference, however: both in Washington and in Chicago the Negro fought back. He was armed, and in his own district, despite the police, he protected himself. To

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some extent, as the casualty lists show, he retaliated. Much of the fighting, most of it in fact, was occasioned by white hoodlums and was deprecated by sober citizens. Still, the Negro had an unsympathetic environment and an inequitable administration of the law and of the police to contend with. The measures he took for defense were not entirely unnecessary.

Although the fighting in Chicago was preceded by bombing of Negro residences, was occasioned by the unprovoked murder of a Negro boy by a white man at a bathing beach, and although white mobs burned Negro houses and brutally murdered unoffending Negroes, the Chicago Grand Jury found it necessary to protest against proceedings begun exclusively against Negroes. They found it necessary to call to the attention of officers of the law the fact that if Negroes alone were prosecuted and no white men, dangerous tension might be renewed between white and colored citizens.

The press, as always, recklessly prejudiced the public safety. When a disastrous fire burned eighty houses of Poles and Lithuanians near the stockyards, the Chicago Daily Journal and the Chicago Evening Post carried stories, news articles and headlines imputing the blaze to Negro incendiaries animated by race hatred. A white man was subsequently arrested charged with having set the fire. The immediate consequence of this newspaper outcry was a movement to deprive Negroes of their jobs at the stockyards. The packing houses actually had to postpone for three days reemploying their colored workmen. When the Negro stockyard employees did return to work, it was only under a heavy militia guard and white workers made their objection to the guard a pretext for threatening a general strike against the employment of Negroes. Meanwhile a number of hotels and other places of employment announced they had replaced their Negro employees with white men.

Coincident with the economic retribution the race riots put upon the Negro came numerous suggestions that the North must adopt the southern policy of Jim-Crowism. Of Jim-Crowism in the North there seems to be slight danger. The Negro's struggle here will be in the field of industry. He will have the difficulty, so long as he remains unorganized, of any group of workers permanently distinguished by superficial characteristics from their fellows. The American Federation of Labor has begun to recognize the danger of this division and its possible uses against labor. It was this, probably, that motivated President Gompers at Atlantic City. Despite industrial troubles, the Negro will continue to come North as his manhood rebels against the position of inferiority in every sense which is forced upon him in the South.

The question, then, which the Negro has posed, arises from a caste civilization of the South, which, as soon as the war furnished occasion, extended its problems to the entire nation. That question is: What place is there in a democracy for permanently distinct racial groups who accept that democracy on its own terms? In the growth of his determination to die if necessary in this country in defense of democracy, the Negro has shown his readiness to maintain it. The problem becomes one of ways and means. It demands study and investigation rather than passion and obscurantism.

HERBERT J. SELIGMANN.

A COMMUNICATION

The New Anglo-Persian Treaty: An Asiatic View

THE imperialist never does anything except for the good of the people whom he brings under subjection. England rules Ireland for the good of the Irish, India for the good of the Indians, Egypt for the Egyptians, and now she is going to rule over Persia for the good of the Persians. The military and the public purse are the two outstanding emblems of sovereignty. War and peace both depend upon them. England is going to control both of these under the new treaty which she has made with Persia, for the benefit of the Persians. We are assured by the New York Times that the "entire press of England welcomes the treaty . . . as good for Persia and necessary for the safeguarding of India." A few liberal papers however are grumbling, as usual. The Daily News says that "the treaty, while guaranteeing Persia's independence does not leave her a free hand;" the Manchester Guardian remarks that "if this had been done by another Power the arrangement would be regarded as a veiled protectorate;" the Liverpool Post observes that the "the secret way in which the matter has been gone about is certainly unpleasant." The French press is very uneasy and the Supreme Allied Council at Paris is somewhat disturbed.

This is another illustration of "open covenants, openly arrived at" and also of how the League of Nations is going to protect the small nations that have been invited to join it. The bargain is apparently to the mutual advantage of the parties. Persia gets the protection of Great Britain as Egypt did, the blessings of English rule as India and Ireland have, and England gets an additional vote in the League of Nations. The United States will, of course, bless the new arrangement as she has already done in the case of Egypt.

Yet there is another side of the picture. The Young Persians threaten revolt. One of them, writing to a friend, from France, over date July 19, 1919, says:

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"Persia, poor Persia, is breathing the last moments of her existence. The English have put up a very reactionary cabinet which is seeking nobody's interest except their private pockets. They are controlling the election of the Parliament which is now going on, so as to secure a majority of old men, ignorant bribe takers, rascals. They (presumably the English) are taking all sorts of concessions for railroads, and mines. They are publicly demanding that Persia secure British advisers for their administration, in other words, they are playing the same game of eighty years ago in Egypt. They are strangling us and yet they call us independent. All the young and educated element is exiled and there are scores of them living in Paris and Switzerland. The Shah, that young rascal, has become a vassal of the English, fattening his pocket, and ignoring the everyday life of the people which passes before his eyes."

"The situation in Persia has never been so gloomy as it is today. The only solution is revolution, by which the present traitors can be overthrown and punished. I am glad of one thing, and that is that this darkness will only bring about better days. The more the people suffer the more they will realize that they should wake up. Everybody has to keep his mouth shut when he goes there, but I have hopes. To tell you the truth, at present John Bull has not only India and Egypt but Persia and Turkey, Afghanistan and Turkestan, Caucasia and Armenia. All these countries are full of English troops. They are ruled directly or indirectly by the English. The darkness prevails, but hope and confidence will surely take us through the darkness and make us reach the light." The other young Persians are also raising a protest.

We have let the young Persian speak for himself, without even crossing his t's and dotting his i's, except that we have omitted three words in which he speaks of the young Shah in rather unparliamentary language. Those who have followed the domestic struggle in Persia which started in 1907, and has been going on since, in spite of temporary reverses due to intrigues of the Russian and British diplomacy, can appreciate the force of the young Persian's remarks.

As the Paris Temps points out, Persia has a constitution by which a treaty to be binding requires to be ratified by the Persian Majlis (Parliament) unless for the sake of expediency it is a secret treaty. Now England is not prepared to take any chances. Although the treaty is secret and does not require the ratification of the Persian parliament England is taking steps to secure a majority of her own liking in the Persian Majlis. The English may have that majority and the treaty may be ratified but to us it seems that England's imperialism in Moslem countries may very likely be the first effective step toward the disintegration of the British Empire.

In her anxiety to "safeguard" her empire in India, Great Britain is destroying the independence of the Moslem nations, one by one. It is mockery to say that Afghanistan and Persia are any more independent than Egypt. To them is going to be added Mesopotamia and the "independent" kingdom of Hedjaz. Moslem Turkestan must follow suit. The whole Moslem world will thus come under the sway of Great Britain; the latter will make railways, and set telegraphic and postal communications between these countries and thus realize the dream of Cape Colony to Cairo and Cairo to Calcutta. This will give the last finishing touch to the edifice of the greatest empire that the world has ever known. Then will begin the decline. The Moslems can *never* be reconciled to the destruction of their political power. The passive "loyalty" of the Indian Moslems has so far been principally due to the lack of free intercourse with the Moslems of other countries and their belief that Great Britain was the best friend of Turkey. That belief has been destroyed and even if Great Britain manages to let the Sultan retain the nominal sovereignty of Constantinople, which is problematic, the Moslems will not accept that concession as a mark of England's friendship for the Mohammedans. The young Persian's remarks on the subject are very significant. The British protectorate over Persia, Mesopotamia, Hedjaz, Turkestan, and Egypt means for the Mohammedans numerous opportunities of intercourse and thus what is a misfortune, now, will, in the course of time, turn to be a blessing in disguise. The Hindus of India have already adopted an attitude of friendliness towards the Moslems and they will not do anything which is likely to hamper the Mohammedans regaining their independence in purely Moslem countries. England is relying on her capacity to purchase the support of the princes and the chiefs by guaranteeing their power, privilege and purse against the democratic wave, but she is entirely mistaken in her estimate of Islam and her potentialities if she thinks that in all Moslem countries she will succeed so well as she has in India. She may for the time being crush the feeling of Moslem resentment in India; she may base her calculations on her ability to crush the Bolsheviki in Russia; having crushed Germany and Russia she may feel safe in her friendship of France and the United States, but time only will prove whether she has not involved herself in entanglements which may sooner or later be her undoing. Filled with their victory the English are riding on a new wave of imperialism which eventually may be the last.

LAJPAT RAI.

Nations or Members of the League?

SIR: One obscure point weakens the force of Dr. Kallen's interesting argument in favor of Article X of the Covenant(New Republic, August 6th): Does Article X guarantee *nations,* or *members of the League,* against external aggression? If it guarantees *nations,* then it may, as Dr. Kallen argues, guarantee security of internal change; and Mexico and Soviet Russia, outside of the League, are as well protected against interference in their internal readjustments as are Haiti and San Domingo, within the League, against annexation. But the extract quoted by Dr. Kallen from Article X speaks only of a guarantee to *members of the League.* How does that protect a Mexico, "significantly" not invited to join the League of Nations? And if Article X does not protect nations who are not members and who can be barred from membership as long as their ideas of "self-government" do not suit the great Powers, why should Article X have the support of liberals?

DOROTHY BREWSTER.

New York City.

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Bankrupt?

Saint's Progress, by John Galsworthy. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

SOMETHING has departed from Mr. Galsworthy. When he began to write he was said in some quarters to be a man of medium intelligence and of limited capacity for experience. Obviously he had his decorum and his extreme repression. But there was in him that exceptional sensitiveness to people which is the essence of poignant fiction, and with it went social irony and courage and a delicate yet powerful strain of idealism. It was perhaps a slim gift of divine energy, but it was divine and it was energy and it ennobled his earlier books and plays. And then something happened. The thin cuticle thickened. The curious power of insisting on spiritual realities stiffened into priggishness or wobbled into sentimentalism. What was like Turgeniev in him eventually vanished like the dew. There now remains a facile, graceful, rather nerveless and distinctly complacent magazine storyteller who has practically ceased to be an artist but who still presents an accomplished imitation of the real thing.

Mr. Galsworthy knows his "upper middle class" England. He commands its idiom almost too easily and he is familiar with its habit of mind. He is touched with a poetic appreciation of nature and the natural beauty of trees and flowers, and the world is not so much with him that he cannot imagine and suggest the aura that so often escapes the realist. It is on the basis of these aptitudes and facilities that he produces Saint's Progress. But where before he would have approached his English group with a fastidious truthfulness he is now content to fabricate as he sees fit. His elderly clergyman, too intent on his ideals to be a humanistic parent, becomes a Saint drearily sentimentalized. The saint's daughter Noel, ("Nollie" for short), is a transgressor against convention to the extent of having an illegitimate child during war-time; but while exhibiting her as deeply in love with her soldier and his legal wife except for the father's opposition and the boy's sudden departure for France, Mr. Galsworthy also exhibits her as a guilty creature to whom he is sweetly indulgent. The man who eventually rescues her from her guiltiness is an almost laughably correct version of the strong, silent Englishman. The pathos of the happy ending is in itself not important, but combined with the polite death-bed scene at which the old clergyman officiates in the hospital in Egypt, it marks a deterioration in Mr. Galsworthy not to be disguised.

But in addition to the conventionalizing of these contemporary portraits in line with herd expectations, there is an actual vulgarity of attitude which is not uninteresting. "They had found their enchanted spot, and they moved no further, but sat with their arms round each other, while the happy Being of the wood watched. A marvelous speeder-up of Love is War. What might have taken six months, was thus accomplished in three weeks." If it is all right to "make Culture hum," it is all right to speed-up Love. But then why not say, "The armistice threw sand in Love's gear-box," or "At this point their Love took a tragic slump." Mr. Galsworthy is no longer meticulous, however. He gives us such platitudes as these: "Certainly Edward Pierson shrank from the rough touches of a Knock-about philosophy. After all, it was but natural that he should." And of the strong, silent man: "English to the backbone, he could not divest himself of a sense of guilt." Substitute for English the word Ruthenian or Czecho-Slovak, and the silliness of the phrase is apparent. It is only one of dozens of banal phrases that refer to religion, patriotism, motherhood, love. On these topics, Mr. Galsworthy is now as almost as profound an authority as Mrs. Humphry Ward.

The vulgarity is most significant, of course, in regard to the war-baby. Mr. Galsworthy shows representatively enough how the herd operates in good religious circles. There is the shower of anonymous letters, the hounding of the Saint, the transmission of smug reproof from those in authority. Little boys call "bastard" after members of the family, and everywhere men and women punish Noel for being irregular. But where Mr. Galsworthy's tired middle-aged conception is different from his earlier conceptions is in the estimate he puts on Noel's own relation to herself. It seems to him quite right that Noel should be regarded as having lost something of her chastity. "I want music and dancing and light," she cries, and the Belgian takes her to a cabaret and orders her crême de menthe. This is the emphasis that Mr. Galsworthy always gives to Noel. She had an illegitimate child, therefore she begs her brother-in-law to "loose the goat." But in the end, naturally, the goat is tied up and Noel marries the man who is English to his backbone.

Even the elderly clergyman Mr. Galsworthy sees as he ought to see him, sitting by a Victorian death-bed scene. "In faith I have lived, in faith I will die." So he says, and shifts once more away from Pragmatism and, as Mr. Galsworthy puns, prig-matism. Mr. Galsworthy believes he has portrayed a pathetic outworn figure. The truth is, he has stuffed a traditional clerical shirt. F. H.

The Progress of English Social History

Education and Social Movements, by A. E. Dobbs. New York: Longmans Green & Co.

THE reconstruction of English social history goes on apace; and it has now reached a point where a general survey of progress has become possible. In a sense, the revival of interest in the inarticulate masses is perhaps due more to J. R. Green than any other single historian. He at least it was who cared more for Shakespeare than for Agincourt, and realised that Wesley was not less significant in the life of the people than Chatham. Since his time much special work of superlative quality has been done. In his life of Francis Place Mr. Graham Wallas recovered a unique figure for English history; and it is hardly too much to say that his book has set the perspective of all later writing upon the period. Mr. and Mrs. Hammond have written books upon the laborer of the Industrial Revolution which are works of imaginative historical genius. The writings of Mr. and Mrs. Webb on local government owe more to their massive exhaustiveness than to subtleness of insight; but they mark an epoch in English scholarship. M. Halévy's volumes on the early utilitarians are a model combination of exact scholarship and brilliant interpretation.

Mr. Dobbs's book is not perhaps in the front rank of this arresting tradition; but it is with the best of such work that its kinship lies. What it lacks is sharpness of conception and finish of detail. It reads as though Mr. Dobbs had been so mastered by his material as to lack that art of omission which, as Stevenson says, enables the historian to make an Iliad out of a daily newspaper. There does not, as a consequence, emerge from his narrative so definite a portrait of the time as his reader will find in Mr. Wallas's book or

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in those of Mr. and Mrs. Hammond. Yet what he has to tell us is invaluable and it throws a welcome light on places that have hitherto been dark. As with other investigators of the time, his book mainly shows that it is of a transitional period that he is writing. He begins when England is still largely an agricultural country and he ends where the failure of the Chartist movement took back the hopes of men to the surer path of economic organization. It is a complex narrative he has to unfold. In part it is a record of deliberate usurpation of facilities at one time freely accorded to men who could enjoy them. Here, as elsewhere, the Reformation is the great signpost of change; and here, as elsewhere, it is far from clear that its coronation of individual effort has been all to the public good. William Lovett and Samuel Bamford might escape the tragedies of lesser men's lives; but they do not prove, as utilitarian advocates of laissez-faire were too wont to assume, that the path of knowledge is accessible to any man of energy and patience. Rather do we grow convinced that only when the gates are thrown open so wide that the key to knowledge is the common possession of men will there be even the foundations for an adequate civilization. The problem is less the provision of an equal opportunity than of insistence upon a common minimum of attainment.

The book seems to suggest the necessity of two hypotheses in social history. The first is the utility of that overworked phrase, the spirit of the time. When the last word has been said of local peculiarities—Lancashire, it appears, has a zeal for science unshared by Cornwall—there is abroad a common prevailing spirit to the mould of which specialized differences must adapt themselves. Often the suppression so implied is unfortunate enough. One wishes that, somehow, the self-regulating classes in metaphysics which William Lovett persuaded the mechanics of London to organize had not given way to institutes where complacent egoists like Brougham worked off their surplus enthusiasm. Most of the movements Mr. Dobbs records are indigenous to the people. Knowledge of them invites the participation of well-meaning members of the middle class—churchmen, conscientious manufacturers, natural-born welfare workers like Hannah More. What was in its origin typical of the workers themselves then becomes perverted to the prevailing tendencies of the time. The workers want to debate politics, and classes in the industrial arts are lavished upon them. They hunger for fiction, the ballad, the popular folk-lore that is so especially their own; and they are given the Bible and the tracts of the S.P.C.K. as more adequate and befitting to their stations. They want to read Tom Paine, and, instead, they are bespattered with the benevolent absurdities of Mrs. Trimmer; very much as the worker who wants to read Lenin's account of industrial problems in Russia is put off with the Christian warblings of Mr. John D. Rockefeller, Jr.

The explanation is of importance, though it would need a book to suggest its implications. It seems clear enough, particularly in the light of what Mr. Dobbs and the Hammonds have revealed, that most popular movements take their ultimate form from their relation to government. Anglo-Saxon communities have hitherto been largely immune from the forceful control of continental bureaucracy; but the direction given to their effort by politics, though more indirect, has been none the less powerful. The Anglo-Saxon habit is to wait until the movement is sufficiently determinate to demand a judgment and then to compromise with it in terms of the dominant class atmosphere of the time. So, by 1833, the movement for popular education was too strong to be resisted; but while the people got a small grant, they got with it church control as well. So, too, with the universities. By 1854 the travesty of national institutions like Oxford being reserved for a single sect was obvious; but when reform came, a compromise was effected by which the church retained control over theological teaching. Nor is this history less true of trade unionism. Everyone knows how the law made worthless the Trade Union act of 1871; and everyone knows also how the House of Lords deliberately destroyed the admitted purpose of the Amending act of 1875. In each case popular demand was at bottom frustrated by a class which had in its hands the machinery of government. There is no effective limit to the possibilities an observer can here discover. Theoretically, for example, the English civil service is open to all competitors. Actually only Oxford and Cambridge men can win the highest posts; and, taken in the mass, poor men do not go—because they cannot afford to go—to Oxford and Cambridge. The tendency of our time is to seek social salvation rather by economic than political means. It yet seems certain that an analysis of the critical epoch of English history reveals the profound error of any method which neglects the potentialities of parliamentary government.

The second hypothesis is one which, ninety years ago, aroused the critical interest of De Tocqueville in his famous analysis of American institutions; though it still awaits its full interpretation. No one who examines the political and social effort of England and America can fail to be impressed by the immense part therein played by voluntary enterprise. The continental peoples seem here stricken with an inertness which a competent student of political psychology would find it well worth while to explain. Mr. Dobbs records that practically every movement which he investigates is brought to maturity by private minds. In France and Germany, on the other hand, it is governmental action which, at each stage, confronts us. Is the secret the retention of some sense of individuality for which the public law of Rome did not provide? A racial difference it can hardly be; for the ultimate foundations of the Anglo-Saxon race go back, in the main, to Teutonic origins. It is surely striking that neither England nor America has known a law of associations, and that the main weapon of governmental stability in France and Germany has lain in the control afforded by such a law of voluntary effort. Anglo-Saxon peoples seem to have a special genius for clubs and committees with some political object behind them. Mr. Dobbs's volume is full of the history of such societies. They are extra-partisan in the technical sense; and they thus raise the interesting question of whether Anglo-Saxon political energy preserves the two-party system because it finds its instinct for association otherwise sublimated, where in France and Germany, social repression implies political multiplication.

Mr. Dobbs announces a second volume which is to bring the narrative up to date. It will be eagerly awaited; for the period he has to cover is full of the richest materials. The story of the invasion of Oxford and Cambridge by the middle-class Nonconformists is alone an epic; and the work of Lord Morley and Mr. Chamberlain in the later sixties marks an epoch in political technique. Nor may one omit the hope that Mr. Dobbs will do the justice it deserves to the magistral effort of Matthew Arnold. It is permissible to suggest that his Educational Reports deserve to be remembered where all save odd fragments of his prose will be long forgotten. They are among the most splendid monuments unconsciously erected by a very great man.

H. J. L.

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The Living Heart of Asia

For India, by W. W. Pearson, M. A. B. Sc. (Cantab.) with an introduction by Paul Richard. Tokio: The Asiatic Association of Japan.

MR. PEARSON is an Englishman who after graduating with honors from the University of Cambridge in 1907, has been engaged in educational and missionary work in India. He visited this country in company with Sir Rabindranath Tagore, the famous Hindu poet. When the poet returned to India, Mr. Pearson stayed behind in Japan. During his stay there, he contributed a series of articles on India to an English paper published at Tokio, which have been collected in this booklet. Dr. Paul Richard has contributed an introduction.

Both the writer of the introduction and the author have displayed an extraordinary inwardness in grasping at the underlying causes of the war and in suggesting the only true road to enduring peace in the future. The war, says Dr. Richard, "is a war of supremacy for the possession of the routes to Asia, for the possession of Asia." The desired rebirth of a free, democratic Europe has in his judgment, "for its condition the restoration, the restitution of Asia—of Asia and first of India. For without India, there is no Asia." India, he adds, is not simply a part of Asia but its living heart, the soul itself. Mr. Pearson agrees with this view and observes that "it is Asia and not Europe that will decide the question of the future peace of the world." Starting with this basis Mr. Pearson shows the international importance of the problem of India. This problem he discusses in this booklet with an impartiality and breadth of view, worthy of the best traditions of English public life. He takes up point after point and on the basis of facts and figures backed by his personal knowledge of conditions in India, he disposes of the stereotyped objections behind which the Imperial Junkers opposed to the freedom of subject nations usually take shelter. Mr. Pearson starts his discussion by propounding the question "Is India ready?" and after proving by facts and arguments that she is ready, he concludes:

> Even if the contrary of what I have stated were true and India were not able to govern herself effectively, even the worst government she could give herself could not lead her to greater ruin than that with which she is threatened today.

The next question which he answers effectively in the affirmative is "Is India united?" In the course of a statement of his impressions of India he remarks, "nothing indeed is more remarkable to one coming from Europe where the sense of nationality is so narrow in its application than to find, in spite of vast differences of race and language, a common sense of the unity of India, a sentiment which has been strengthened by the very attempts of the British to emphasize divisions"—a conclusion so different from the hasty generalizations of globe trotters. After all it is a difference of "eyes and no eyes." From an intimate touch with Indian public life, Mr. Pearson is in a position to testify that whenever a question has arisen which involves Indians as a whole, there has been complete unity of expression and that "there is no inherent reason against the different provinces joining themselves into a United States of India in which the individual states will subordinate themselves to the well-being of the whole."

In the next article discussing the poverty of India he comes to the only conclusion which an examination of facts and figures leads to, and in support of which he quotes from eminent British and Indian authorities viz.: that "the cost of living in India has been steadily rising during the last forty years but the income of the people has been steadily decreasing." He has no hesitation in saying that "it is the unduly heavy taxation of the people which is the root cause of the famines in India." He judges taxation by the capacity to pay as every one should.

In the succeeding articles, he discusses the humiliating position which India and Indians occupy in the Empire; how they are ill treated and discriminated against at home and excluded abroad and he also throws a flood of light on the inwardness of the much advertised Indian loyalty and the coercive methods by which huge contributions of money have been obtained from India. In his opinion "Home rule for India is inevitable and also imminent" and any further postponement of it will be fatal to India's continuance in the empire. He has had ample opportunities of observing the "vital and living forces" which "are at work amongst the people of India" and he knows that these vital forces may be repressed for a time but they can not be suppressed.

Mr. Pearson fears the growth of the revolutionary spirit in India and warns the British against the general carnage which will inevitably follow a revolution there. The remedy in his judgment is the immediate grant of home rule. For "if once the flood of hatred and mutual murder is unloosed there would be no possibility of stemming it by any act of legislation however generous. Just as force dominates Europe . . . . . so in India force would become dominant until from the fire of revolution the people of India emerged a free and self-governing nation."

LAJPAT RAI.

Magazine Verse and Mr. Braithwaite

The Golden Treasury of Magazine Verse. Edited by William Stanley Braithwaite. Boston: Small, Maynard & Co.

ONE can say, without fear of being interrupted except by a few octogenarians, that the poetry printed in the "leading" magazines today is, as a rule, of far higher quality than the typical magazine verse printed eight or nine years ago. The sweetly innocuous sonnets, the heavily sentimental blank verse, the merely babbling rhymes still persist at the bottom of many pages, and the purveyors of such commodities will doubtless continue to find a ready market. But it is likewise indisputable that a great percentage of noteworthy and possibly permanent poetry gets its first audience through the once apathetic journals. No magazine in 1910 would have printed the analytic probings of Edgar Lee Masters, the serious and often fantastic experiments of Amy Lowell, the searching rhapsodies of James Oppenheim, the strepitant chants of Vachel Lindsay, the raucous mysticism of Carl Sandburg. Ten years ago the work of Robert Frost was scorned by the very monthlies that are so anxious to print it today. The birth of a new American poetry has changed the flavor of pages that once were given entirely to insipid, adulterated emotions and to tasteless affectations.

Mr. Braithwaite, with a truly religious fervor, has been

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one of the prime exhorters in this poetic revival; he was, in a sense, its first revivalist. Barring questions of judgment, he has performed his duties faithfully if not fully; he has been always an energetic performer. He has pounded the drum outside of the tent and rushed indoors to mount the pulpit and excite the increasing congregation. Whether America's poetic renaissance owes as much to Mr. Braithwaite as Mr. Braithwaite owes to the renaissance, would be a question both ungracious and irrelevant. The fact remains that he still is one of its most active press agents and, to many, its paternal sponsor. The causes that led to his assuming the latter role are, like the causes of the war, buried in antiquity and the files of The Boston Transcript. His laudations have been reprinted on dozens of paper-jackets. His hardy annuals have grown steadily more foliose and have blossomed with increasing thickness. And now he has given us what is presumably the choice flowering from his various crops in The Golden Treasury of Magazine Verse—an anthology of anthologies, much of which may be culled for the future.

Unfortunately, the same defect is as striking in these assembled poems as is in Mr. Braithwaite's prose. As a critic, he has been ninety per cent a glowing enthusiast; as an enthusiast he is anything but critical. I believe it was F.P.A. who said that nobody could like any poem as much as Braithwaite liked every poem. What is occasionally penetrative or probing in this compiler's work is lost in a maze of lush praise, overreaching catholicity and highly colored rhetoric. Mr. Braithwaite has added to the strength of his latest volume by omitting the perennial preface. But he has damaged it by other omissions of a really grave nature. These omissions nullify to a great extent the importance of the work; they prevent it from being what it tries to be: an authoritative account of the last ten years in American poetry.

A careful reading of these three hundred pages fails to show any record, except for the inclusion of a few second-rate imitators, of the Imagists. No one would know from this compendium that Spoon River Anthology had ever been written. These are but two outstanding deficiencies. A more detailed examination reveals further incongruities. It reveals the editor leading the van with six poems by W. S. Braithwaite—while Carl Sandburg, John Gould Fletcher, William Rose Benét, Josephine Preston Peabody are represented by a solitary one apiece. The lifeless classicism of Louis V. Ledoux is given importance by four pallid examples—and there is not a word of the strong and rousing beauty of Arturo Giovannitti. Ruth Comfort Mitchell appears with three journalistic pieces—but there is somehow no room for Edna St. Vincent Millay, author of Renascence, God's World (from the Forum) and some of the most poignant sonnets that ever appeared in the Century. There is an entire page devoted to a spurious Hungarian Love-Lament, a blend of half a dozen poorly translated folk songs, by a Miss Ethel Syford—but not a line from Lola Ridge's powerful The Ghetto (from the New Republic) or any of her briefer poems from other sources. Space, and a generous amount of it, is accorded to a quantity of indiscriminate tinkle by such negligible versifiers as Kendall Harrison, Caroline Giltinan, Odell Shepard, Elizabeth Hill, Dorothea Lawrence Mann—but nothing by such authentic poets as Arthur Davison Ficke, John G. Neihardt, Max Eastman, John Curtis Underwood, Harriet Monroe, Charles Erskine Scott Wood. Nothing by such provocative experimenters as Alfred Kreymborg, Maxwell Bodenheim, Haniel Long or Alter Brody. Nothing by such genuine lyricists as Zoë Akins, Margaret Widdemer, Helen Hoyt. And, though no anthology of contemporary American verse could possibly be complete without a representation of the group that has helped to bring sugared and over-rhetorical verse into disrepute, there is nothing whatsoever of "H.D.", T. S. Eliot and Ezra Pound.

Such crippling omissions are not due to a mere matter of taste or the absence of it. They point to a primary failure in critical aesthetics. One quarrels with Mr. Braithwaite just as Mr. Braithwaite quarrels with William Lyon Phelps, because of an apparently arbitrary and misrepresentative selection of the poets to whom he credits the achievement of the advance in magazine verse. One is led to believe that, in spite of Mr. Braithwaite's apparent gregariousness, it is his lack of sympathetic knowledge rather than a lack of choice that makes even his friends discount his dicta. One grows to resent even his title, with its attempted echo of Palgrave. It is scarcely a Golden Treasury. It seems, at best, a gilt and silver-plated one.

LOUIS UNTERMEYER.

Ramsey Milholland, by Booth Tarkington. New York: Doubleday, Page & Co.

MR. TARKINGTON'S theme is young collegiate America responding to the war. On a subject so close the calm observation of The Magnificent Ambersons could scarcely be expected. The casualty lists were probably still being published while Ramsey Milholland was being written. Mr. Tarkington could be forgiven if he had yielded to the temptation of heroic lines and epic colors. But, quite the opposite, he has done the sacrifice of America into caricature mixed with melodrama. For this callousness no explanation seems adequate except the one that Mr. Tarkington has followed the line of most remuneration. His book begins sufficiently before the war to take the boy and girl through grammar school and high school, and this affords the chance for a Penrod touch, but the author is obviously preoccupied with getting into the record the boy-hero's Decoration-Day fervors and hatred of German lessons. A few calf-love episodes give the public what they liked in Seventeen. The children are then transferred to the State University. Here they continue to act and talk as if they were in a slightly modified kindergarten, until the sinking of the Lusitania which galvanizes them into calling Congress "blatherskites and boneheads," and the Germans "dirty baby-killing dachshunds." Then in rapid succession the "hot, nasal" Bolshevik Linski is kicked out, the pacifist heroine converted, and Ramsey Milholland made a private in the regular army. That marks the end.—Such cheapening of a real theme passes understanding.

Contributors

JOHN M. BOOKER, Associate Professor of English, University of North Carolina.

HERBERT J. SELIGMANN, a journalist who is at present investigating the race riots in Washington and Chicago.

MORRIS R. COHEN, professor of philosophy at the College of the City of New York, and an authority on the philosophical aspects of jurisprudence.

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